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This study is an enquiry about the role that service quality, asymmetric 
information, scope of regulation and regulator’s preferences play in the regulation of 
monopolies, with an application to the case of the Chilean electricity distribution 
industry. In Chapter 1, I present the problem of regulating a monopolist and introduce the 
special conditions that the electricity sector has. Later I discuss the main characteristics of 
the electricity system that operates in Chile. The literature on regulation is reviewed in 
Chapter 2. A special emphasis is given to the problems of quality and information, and 
the lack of its proper joint treatment. In Chapter 3, I develop four theoretical models of 
regulation that explicitly consider the regulation of price and quality versus price-only 
regulation, and a symmetric versus asymmetric information structure where only the 
regulator knows its true costs. In these models, I also consider the effect of a regulator 
that may have a preference between consumers and the regulated monopolistic firms. I 
conclude that with symmetric information and independent of the scope of regulation, 
 
having a regulator that prefers consumers or producers does not affect the efficiency of 
the outcome. I also show that the regulator’s inability to set quality, thus regulating only 
price, leads to an inefficient outcome, away from the first best solution that can be 
achieved by regulating both price and quality, even with asymmetric information, as long 
as the regulator does not have a “biased” preference for consumers or the monopolistic 
producers. If the regulator has a “bias,” then the equilibrium will be inefficient with 
asymmetric information. But the effect on equilibrium price and quality depends on the 
direction of the effect of quality on the marginal effect of price in demand. More 
importantly, no closed-form solution can be derived unless drastic simplifications are 
made. To further investigate the outcome of the models, I use numerical simulation in 
Chapter 4, assuming flexible functional forms and alternative sets of parameters that 
represent the scenarios of interest. The results show that when the regulator is biased 
toward consumers (producers), symmetric information models yield higher (lower) 
quality except for the most efficient firm. Chapter 5 uses data from the electricity sector 
in Chile and estimates the price and quality elasticity of demand and finds a positive 
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In the past two decades several countries have started a process of privatization 
and deregulation of public enterprises and services. This trend has become increasingly 
important in developing countries and in transition economies. The main arguments 
behind these reforms have been increased efficiency, freeing of public funds, and the 
creation of new investment opportunities (Galal, et al., 1994). The increase in efficiency 
is supposed to come from competition among private firms, differences in the incentive 
structure due to private ownership (profit and property value maximization), and less 
political influence (Bhattacharyya, et al., 1995; Dixit, 1997; Poole and Fixler, 1987; 
Vinning and Boardman, 1992). In many cases, these firms were not able to pay their own 
costs. Thus, their divestiture was seen as a way of reducing the financial burden on the 
fiscal budget. Selling state-owned companies has been used to attract foreign investment 
(Edwards and Baer, 1993). Also, in some countries, privatization was promoted to 
achieve popular capitalism by expanding the number of shareholders in capital markets 
(Hachette and Luders, 1993). 
Some authors have criticized the view that the mere change in ownership will 
produce the promised increase in efficiency. It has been pointed out, with theoretical and 
empirical arguments, that the factor that might have a greater influence on efficiency is 
the existence of competition (Emmons, 1997).Under this conjecture, the conversion of a 
public monopoly to private ownership might not necessarily have an effect on efficiency. 
Moreover, if not properly regulated, it may generate monopolistic rents and losses to 
society. 
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Creating a competitive environment for natural monopolies is not an easy task. 
Some authors have proposed franchising as a way of bringing competition to industries 
where economies of scale do not allow it. In this case, firms compete for the market 
through auctions or other allocation processes (see Demsetz, 1968). This kind of solution 
has been applied more commonly to projects involving the construction and operation of 
highways and ports (see Engel, Fischer and Galetovic, 1997). Another attempt to bring 
competition has been by horizontal or vertical separation of the market. In the phone 
service industry, for example, horizontal separation has been attempted by breaking up a 
national company into regional firms. In the electricity sector, vertical separation has 
been attempted by separating ownership of the generation, transmission and distribution 
systems. 
The evaluation of early attempts at privatization has brought some consensus on 
the best approaches for implementing a privatization plan (Galal, et al., 1994). At the 
same time, these experiences have raised a series of new issues that where not foreseen at 
the time of implementation. Some of the issues that appear particularly relevant are 
regulatory capture, asymmetric information, and unfulfilled efficiency improvement and 
provision of quality. These issues may have the potential for significantly reducing the 
gains expected from the privatization process (Nellis, no date). 
When the regulator sets prices, it takes into account the effects that this would 
have on the industry and the public. If regulatory policy is too lax, there is a political cost 
that comes from the public‘s perception of being harmed by the privatized industry. On 
the other hand, if the regulatory authority or any other institution appears to be 
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excessively stringent or even arbitrary with the industry, it sends a message that may 
discourage investors and risk future investments.  
Frequently, regulatory agencies lack the means (financial and technical) to 
confront private corporations. Corruption or lack of adequate capacity of authorities can 
lead to an improved stance for the regulated industry. This asymmetry of information can 
lead to inefficiencies and extraordinary rents. One of the concerns when regulating a 
monopoly is efficiency improvement. Because there is no competition, the incentives to 
reduce cost and become more efficient are absent. This is why different regulatory 
mechanisms have tried to incorporate incentives that promote increased efficiency.  
Another concern has been the adequate provision of quality. Depending on the 
nature of the service being regulated, the monopolist may have an incentive to provide 
less than the economically efficient level of quality. Because most regulatory instruments 
focus most on prices, quality can be adversely affected when prices are reduced if no 
adequate mechanism to control quality is in place. To confront this problem, authorities 
can use standards and penalties. In many cases, enforcing these quality standards has not 
been an easy task; the significance of the welfare effects that this phenomenon has had in 
practice is still an open question. 
The questions that I propose to answer deal with these issues from a theoretical, 
empirical, and policy-oriented perspective. What are the welfare effects of regulatory 
capture? Also, I examine the role of information in the regulatory process. Are 
information asymmetries significant to the outcome? I investigate the efficiency changes 
under a regulated environment. How can regulation induce efficiency improvements? 
What is the role of quality in the regulatory process? Does it work as a pressure valve that 
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regulated companies can use when regulated prices are too low? Under what conditions is 
quality affected by the stringency of the pricing policy? 
To answer these questions I develop a theoretical model based on the latest 
contributions to the literature. The model is based on a specific case for which an 
empirical analysis is conducted. This analysis answers the questions not answered by the 
theoretical model. In particular, I will consider the case of electricity distribution in Chile. 
Chile, a pioneer in the privatization of public utilities, started its privatization in the early 
1980’s, accumulating enough experience to allow its analysis as a consolidated system 
(Millan, no date). 
In the next section, I give a general introduction to the regulation of electricity 
systems followed by a description of the electricity industry in Chile. Chapter 2 presents 
a review of the theoretical literature on regulation and empirical studies that have 
considered asymmetric information and studies about the Chilean system. Drawing from 
these literatures, I propose a model in Chapter 3 that represents this industry and 
addresses explicitly the issues of quality of service, asymmetric information, and 
regulator preferences that arises in the discussion of previous chapters. Because the 
theoretical model does not have a definite answer to the impact of these issues in the 
regulatory problem, Chapter 4 presents a numerical simulation based on the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 3. Using actual data from the operation of the Chilean 
distribution system, an empirical model of demand that estimates the impact of quality on 
demand is presented in Chapter 5. Conclusions are presented in Chapter 6. 
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1.1 The Regulation of Electricity Systems 
Electricity sectors have traditionally been viewed as natural monopolies, where 
economies of scale and scope justify the existence of public or strongly regulated private 
firms.1 In many cases, these utilities are vertically integrated, owning generation units, 
transmission lines and distribution grids. They also commonly supply energy only to 
specific geographic areas, using connections with other areas merely as a means to 
overcome shortages. When utilities are not publicly owned, regulations are imposed to 
avoid monopolistic behavior. The most widely used regulations are entry control, price 
and service quality settings, coverage expansion requirements, and investments in new 
generation capacity. Often, prices are set to ensure a “fair rate of return” to investors. 
Technological change has somewhat altered the view that electricity generation is 
a natural monopoly. The fact that new production units are economically efficient at 
smaller sizes has lowered barriers to entry and, therefore, increased competition.2 Also, 
the increase in electricity consumption has dramatically expanded the market, opening 
opportunities to new sources of power and connecting markets that were previously 
isolated. This has resulted in increased opportunities for competition. In some places, 
these opportunities have been seized by the introduction of reforms that try to capture the 
benefits of restricted forms of competition. 
Most of the reforms proposed, or actually implemented, try to disintegrate the 
electricity market vertically and horizontally by leaving the ownership of generation, 
transmission and distribution segments in different hands. This would allow for more 
competition and increased efficiency due to the new access that generators have to 
                                                 
1  A public firm is defined here to be a government-owned firm. 
2  Some authors argue that technological change has been driven by bad regulations, leading to generation 
units of “sub-optimal” size (Joskow, 1997). 
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distributors and/or consumers. Several variations have being proposed (and implemented) 
to increase competition in a disintegrated market by unbundling the energy bought by the 
final consumer.3 Some of these alternatives suggest creating a competitive market at the 
wholesale level, where generators and distributors freely trade, keeping transmission and 
distribution regulated. Other approaches recommend creating a competitive retail market, 
where final consumers buy electricity from generators and pay for unbundled but 
regulated costs of transmission and distribution (Joskow, 1997). Free entry to the 
distribution and transmission markets has also been suggested, but these alternatives have 
not been well regarded because they can bring over-investment and other costly 
externalities to society. 
In most of these cases, the distribution of electricity would remain as a monopoly 
and, therefore, would require regulation or public ownership. In a scenario where mainly 
private companies handle distribution, the government must set up a scheme to avoid 
monopolistic behavior and guarantee adequate supply.  
1.2 The Chilean Electricity System 
This section presents a general overview of the development, structure, and basic 
operation of the Chilean electricity system.4 Electrification in Chile began in the 1880’s. 
At this time, private companies did most of the investment and the role of the state 
remained minimal. Electric companies were located near consumption centers and 
isolated from other generators. Usually the same company carried out generation and 
                                                 
3  For a more detailed description of alternative schemes, see Joskow and Schmalensee, (1983) and Joskow 
(1997).  
4  While this chapter describes the Chilean electricity system and the laws that have regulated it since 
privatization, a discussion of the perceived successes and failures of regulation is delayed to the next 
chapter.  
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distribution. After many small companies emerged, they begun to interconnect with one 
another and, in some cases, merged. From this process, three large vertically integrated 
firms arose in different geographical areas of the country.  
In the 1940’s, lack of investment in areas of low profitability became apparent 
and a state-owned enterprise was created.5 This institution made investment decisions; 
ran generation, transmission and distribution facilities; and planned long-term electricity 
supply of the country. Government intervention in the form of low tariffs halted private 
investment until the 1960’s when government support expanded private investment. In 
the early 1970’s, in the midst of deep political changes, most of the firms where 
nationalized and tariffs were kept artificially low. 
In the late 1970’s, state-owned companies were reorganized, reducing labor and 
selling assets not directly related to their business. In 1981, the largest state-owned 
companies were vertically and horizontally divided but remained state-owned. They were 
also given greater independence from the government and were required to self-finance 
their operations. Some of the small subsidiaries were privatized. During the late 1980’s, 
the main distribution and generating companies were privatized. The transmission grids 
were privatized together with the largest generation company. 
The Chilean electricity system is comprised of four geographically separated and 
independent systems. Two of them, located in southern Chile, are small and vertically 
integrated. The northern (SING) and central (SIC) interconnected systems are 
characterized mainly by private generation, transmission and distribution firms.6 The 
northern system provides most of its energy to the mining sector and most of the energy 
                                                 
5  Only 40% of the urban population had electricity, although per capita consumption was among the 
highest in the region (Soto, 1999). 
6  There are plans to connect these two systems in the future. 
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comes from thermoelectric generation. The central system is the largest in the country 
and its main source is hydroelectric generation. 
In 1982, a new electricity law was introduced.7 According to its authors, the 
objective was to expand society’s welfare by allowing competition where possible 
(Bernstein, 1998). This law recognizes three different segments in the provision of 
electricity: generation, transmission and distribution. The first one is viewed as partially 
competitive and the other two are considered natural monopolies and are regulated as 
such. Final consumers are divided into two types: small and large.8 The latter are allowed 
to buy electricity directly from the generators. Small consumers must buy electricity from 
distributors at a regulated price.  
Figure 1.1. The Chilean Electricity System Structure 
 
 
                                                 
7  See General Electricity Law (D.F.L. N° 1, 1982. Ministerio de Minería, República de Chile) 









Figure 1.1 presents a diagram of the structure of the Chilean electricity system. 
Node prices and distribution tolls are directly regulated by the authority. Transmission 
tolls can be freely agreed between firms. The “spot” market, where generators trade 
among one another according to clearance given by the system operator, has a price equal 
to “marginal cost” of the last generator to enter production. The following explains in 
more detail each of these segments and their regulation. 
Historically, hydroelectric plants have generated most of the energy (about 80%) 
in years with normal precipitation. Thermoelectric plants have used coal and diesel as 
their main fuel. More recently, natural gas was becoming increasingly important until its 
import from Argentina was abruptly restricted. Whenever there have been deficits in 
hydro-power, thermoelectric facilities have been used to produce what is needed to meet 
the demand. 
The composition of the generation facilities has been evolving towards more 
efficient and cheaper fuels. Upon the construction of natural gas pipelines from 
Argentina, gas-fueled electric production has become increasingly important. Until 
recently gas-fueled plants had emerged as a competitive alternative to hydro generation 
and were expected to increase their participation significantly in future years. But the 
sudden reduction in Argentina’s gas exports has stopped generation based on natural gas. 
The market operation is based on marginal cost pricing as a means of minimizing 
the costs of operation of the system. Depending on which agents are involved, the law 
defines three types of pricing mechanisms for energy and power exchanges: 
• Spot Market: Generators can trade among themselves when they have shortages 
or surpluses from their contracts. They trade at the short-run marginal cost of the 
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system that is determined by the dispatch center. They can also buy energy from 
another generator at a lower cost to substitute their own generation. 
• Free Price: Generators can negotiate contracts with large consumers who demand 
more than 2 MW. This market is not regulated because these consumers are 
supposed to be large enough to have a good bargaining position. For example, 
they could develop their own generation facilities at competitive rates. 
Commercial and industrial clients represent around 30% of the central 
interconnected system’s (SIC) total consumption. These contracts, which typically 
specify energy and power prices, may also include provisions for service 
reliability.9 
• Node Price: Generators can freely agree on the amount of energy and power to be 
offered to distributors, but transactions occur at the regulated node prices. The 
National Energy Commission (CNE) sets the node prices. Each node represents a 
point in the grid for which energy and power prices are determined. 
The CNE estimates short-run average marginal costs of generation for the 
following four years. This estimate considers actual and forecasted future installed 
capacity, growth in demand, hydrological conditions, and generation input prices. After a 
regulated price is estimated, the law establishes that it must stay within a band of 10% of 
the free price. 
To forecast future supply, the regulator uses a ten-year plan-of-work according to 
generators’ intentions to invest in new capacity. Node prices are indexed by the exchange 
rate, fuel, and other input prices, and are recalculated twice a year to incorporate the 
hydrological conditions. Generators can request recalculation of node prices when 
                                                 
9  Energy in this context is defined as the time integral of power. 
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significant changes in these variables occur, but no change larger than 10% can be made 
within the six-month period. 
Node prices for power are intended to reflect the (long-run) marginal cost of 
increasing installed capacity to meet peak power demands. For this purpose, only hydro 
and natural-gas turbine costs are considered because only these forms of production are 
able to respond on short notice. Because hydro construction costs are very site-specific, 
the costs associated with developing a gas turbine of 50 MW are used in practice. These 
prices have the double incentive of reducing peak demand and increasing generation 
capacity. These prices are estimated for a reference node and then prices are derived for 
other nodes using penalization factors according to losses in transmission lines. 
The load dispatch centers are the system operators. They oversee the smooth 
operation of each system. They are private institutions with a public mandate and are 
directed by representatives from the largest generators of each system. Their main duties 
are: 
• Coordinating and verifying preventive maintenance of the generation plants. 
• Determining the amount and value of energy transfer among generators. 
• Calculating the instantaneous marginal cost of generation 
Energy transfers take place at marginal cost, which is estimated according to the 
stated marginal costs of the last unit called into production. If this unit is at its maximum 
capacity, then the marginal cost of the next plant to be called into generation is used to 
determine the system’s marginal cost. When demand is too high and there are no 
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generators left to call into production, shortage costs are used as the system’s marginal 
cost.10 
The marginal storage cost of hydro plants is given mainly by the economic value 
of water, which is estimated by the dispatch center based on present and future water 
availability and demand conditions. 
Although cost minimization is one of the main criteria used to order the entry into 
production, reliability of the generator is also taken into account. For this purpose, the 
central economic dispatch center (CDEC) uses the firm power of each facility to 
determine the order of dispatch in periods of peak demand. Firm power indicates the 
plant’s fully available capacity during periods of peak power demand. For thermoelectric 
facilities, firm power is estimated taking into consideration the need for maintenance and 
unexpected failures. For hydroelectric facilities, firm power is estimated based on 
hydrological history and maintenance. 
Privatization of the transmission segment was accomplished by franchising the 
electric lines. The owner of a transmission franchise is required to provide access to the 
network if transmission capacity is available. If there is no capacity available, they must 
build it and charge the user for it. 
Transmission tolls can be freely agreed between the franchisee and the generators, 
but in the case of no agreement the law establishes a compensation scheme composed of 
three different charges:11 
• Tariff compensation, which corresponds to the difference in node prices and is 
given by the power losses in transmission. Because this payment is, in general, 
                                                 
10  For a description of how the outage costs are estimated, see Serra and Fierro (1997). 
11  Article 51, General Electricity Law (D.F.L. N° 1, 1982. Ministerio de Minería, República de Chile). 
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lower than total average cost due to economies of scale, it does not allow for the 
financing of the system and therefore other forms of compensation are required. 
• A Basic Toll, which covers the remaining investment, operation and maintenance 
costs of all the equipment in the influence area of the generator, once the tariff 
compensation has been paid. The tolls are prorated among generators according to 
their use (load) of the line. 
• An Additional Toll, which is a payment the generator must pay when the energy 
withdrawal is done through a node outside the area of influence. 
The owner of the concession estimates these rates. If there are conflicts, the 
parties can request arbitration. Also the user can always build its own transmission line if 
an agreement cannot be reached with the transmission company.12 
Distribution companies are granted rights to provide energy to consumers in a 
specific geographic location. The final consumer pays a regulated price that is equal to 
the sum of the node price and the distribution value-added (VAD). This value considers 
three types of costs to distribution companies: 
• Fixed costs related to management, billing, and customer service. 
• Electricity losses of distribution. 
• Investment, operation, and maintenance cost per unit of power supplied. 
These costs are calculated every 4 years through studies done by independent 
consultants hired by the authority. The distribution companies can hire their own studies 
and, if the results are different, the rates are averaged, weighting their rate estimates by 
1/3 and the regulator’s rate by 2/3. 
                                                 
12  This has already happened. The case in which it happened is often mentioned as an example of the 
problems of this law. 
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The CNE establishes a set of final consumer tariffs based on node prices and 
VAD tariff formulas (each adapted to different ways of measuring consumption) that 
grants a rate of return between 6 and 14% to the distribution industry as a whole. For 
these calculations, firms provide estimates of income with the new tariff and the regulator 
estimates the costs considering an efficient (or ideal) distribution company. These tariff 
formulas are indexed to prices related to the costs of distribution companies. Whenever 
there is a change, the firms are allowed to change the rates, but if there is a reduction 
larger than 2% they are required to do so.  
The Superintendence of Electricity and Fuels (SEC) is in charge of monitoring the 
quality of service. To do so, the law requires annual consumer surveys and a log of 
customers’ complaints. Because, technically, the right of distribution is also a franchise, 
the only penalty the government can impose is the loss of the franchise. In practice, this is 
not a very credible threat. The other sanction is through private lawsuits that consumers 
may launch if they suffer losses due to bad service. 
Table 1.1 shows the participation of firms in the main integrated systems in 1998. 
Endesa (controlled by the Enersis group) is the largest generator of the SIC with 54% of 
total electricity. At the same time, Endesa and its affiliate Transelec control 81% of the 
transmission lines in the SIC. Finally, Chilectra, also part of the Enersis group, owns 37% 
of the distribution networks. This vertically integrated structure was inherited from the 
privatization process. 
This structure has been the source of many conflicts in the system. Many of the 
disputes have reached the Supreme Court. In spite of the last government’s effort to 
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revert this situation (of vertical integration), firms have been able to maintain this 
structure. 
The fact that the largest national generating enterprise was divested together with 
its water rights (to the best available sources of hydro power) has deterred the entrance of 
new hydro generators, leaving the main role of generation to existing companies. This 
scenario has begun to change since natural gas has been shipped from Argentina. 
Nevertheless, these same generators have tried to secure their participation in new 
generation in spite of government efforts to avoid it. 
Table 1.1. Chilean Electricity Industry Structure 
Firmsa 
Generation Transmission lines Distribution 
SIC SING SIC SING SIC SING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - percentages of electricity - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Endesa (Controlled by Enersis) 54.8 4.7 12.3 3.6 - - 
Gener Group 26.3 17.5 7.7 8.0 - - 
Colbún 14.7 - - - - - 
Tocopilla - 40.2 - 31.6 - - 
Edelnor - 26.3 . 28.9 - - 
Other Generators 4.2 11.3 0.5 - - - 
Transelec (owned by Endesa) - - 69.5 - - - 
Transnet - - 6.5 - - - 
Private Transmission Lines 
(mining Co.) 
- - - 27.9 - - 
Chilectra (controlled by 
Enersis) 
- - - - 37.0 - 
Chilquinta - - - - 11.1 - 
CGE - - - - 16.8 - 
Other private distribution Co. - - - - 35.1 - 
State Companies - - - - - 100 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
a SIC is the Sistema Interconectado Central (the Central Interconnected Electrical System). 
SING is the Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande (the Northern Interconnected Electrical System). 
Source: Basañes, Saavedra, and Soto (1999) with data from CNE. 
1.3 Conclusions to Chapter 1 
A recent round of privatizations in many developing and transition economies is 
viewed as welfare improving policy. In these countries, regulated industries in many 
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cases represent a significant proportion of the economy, and their growth is viewed as a 
means of accelerating development. In some cases, competition can be fostered with a 
privatized market. But in others, like electricity distribution, this cannot be done due, at 
least in part, to economies of scale where the provider is a monopolist. In these cases, the 
best approach has been to privatize and regulate, while providing an incentive to increase 
efficiency. But success depends crucially on how the regulation is actually implemented, 
because it poses its own set of problems. Appropriate price setting requires costly 
information, which may be known by the monopolist but not the regulator. Also, if the 
incentive to reduce costs is too high, the result can be a reduction in long-term 
investments or other activities not considered in the regulation. Quality of service is an 
example. If not included in the regulatory contract, changes in quality may serve as a 
“pressure valve” that the monopolist can use to increase profit while transferring the cost 
to consumers. Another problem that may emerge is that the regulator may be “captured” 
by the industry or other political constituency, leading to a regulation biased towards one 
of the interested parties. 
Thus, a series of questions fundamental for a successful regulation need to be 
answered. I propose to answer some of the following questions from a theoretical, 
empirical, and policy-oriented perspective. What are the welfare effects of regulatory 
capture? Are information asymmetries significant to the outcome? How can regulation 
induce efficiency improvements? What is the role of quality in the regulatory process? 
Does it work as a pressure valve that regulated companies can use when regulated prices 
are too low? Under what conditions is quality affected by the stringency of the pricing 
policy?  
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Chile was one of the first countries to start a massive and broad privatization 
process, and thus represents a good subject for my analysis. In many cases, and in Chile 
in particular, the regulatory environment has been inherited from the privatization of 
state-owned or state-controlled utilities. Divestiture separated the electricity system in 
three basic components: generation, transmission and distribution. Among these, 
generation has admitted the greatest competition whereas distribution had remained as 
local monopolies. Thus, my empirical work is based on the distribution of electricity in 
Chile. One feature of the Chilean electricity sector, not common in developing countries, 
that facilitates my analysis is the systematic application of a survey to electricity 




2 THE LITERATURE ON REGULATION  
This chapter presents a review of the literature relevant to the problem of 
regulating the electricity distribution industry in Chile. I first review the literature on the 
old and new theories of regulation. The latter is mainly an application of the economics 
of information. The theory of regulation provides the foundation for my analysis and the 
source of most of the tools applied in this dissertation. My aim is to examine the role of 
asymmetric information and consequent effects on quality. Only a few studies that have 
investigated regulatory problems like this one. That is, there have been only a few 
attempts to study an electricity system taking explicit account of the regulatory 
framework. Even fewer have focused on the institutional setting of a developing country. 
Thus, I also review that literature on the Chilean electricity system that has tried to 
describe, compare, and derive lessons from its operation. My purpose is to improve 
understanding of the system by developing evidence that supports or opposes some of the 
common beliefs about its behavior. 
2.1 Regulation: Classical Theory and Practice 
The problem of regulation has been studied extensively in economics and other 
disciplines. Dupuit (1952, originally published in 1844), who was probably the first to 
analyze a regulatory problem, studied the optimal pricing policy for a bridge. He 
concluded that the first-best price was a zero per cross charge and a fixed charge to cover 
the construction costs. Hotelling (1938) and Boiteux (1960) further developed the idea of 
marginal cost pricing. The latter extended the literature to consider cases with a capacity 
constraint and concluded that expansion costs should be added to the marginal cost of 
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operation to get first-best prices (peak-load pricing). This approach requires constant 
returns to scale for the operation to break even. Otherwise, if the firm is required to stay 
within its budget constraint, marginal cost pricing cannot be used. In this case, average 
cost pricing is the second-best solution that minimizes the deadweight loss and satisfies 
the budget constraint.13 This scheme is known in the literature as Ramsey-Boiteux 
pricing, since it was first proposed by Ramsey (1927) in the context of optimal taxation 
and later applied to optimal regulation by Boiteux (1960). 
A gap between theory and practice is evident upon examining the policies actually 
implemented in most countries. The most common approach, although this has been 
changing in recent years, is cost-of-service regulation where the firms are allowed to 
charge a price that would allow them to obtain a “fair” rate of return on investment. 
Averch and Johnson (1962) proposed a model of input choice to analyze the implications 
of this kind of regulation. They concluded that this approach created the incentive to 
over-capitalize and make firms prone to resisting (favoring) any policy that would 
diminish (increase) capacity. 
This literature failed to explain observed behavior, and to recommend regulatory 
arrangements that can be implemented in practice. Some of the issues it has failed to 
address are presence of asymmetric information, quality considerations, lack of 
commitment, and the imperfect nature of the regulator. If these elements are not 
considered, further advances in regulation seem hard to achieve. The next section 
presents a review of the main results of the literature that are most relevant to the problem 
I consider. 
                                                 
13  This model assumes that the government is exogenously forbidden to make transfers to the firm (see 
Boiteux, 1971). 
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2.2 Regulation: Modern Approaches  
The development of the literature on mechanism design (Green and Laffont, 
1986; Mirrlees, 1971; Mussa and Rosen, 1978) brought new tools to the field. The first 
study to incorporate these tools was Loeb and Magat (1979). They considered the case 
where leaving rents to the firm had no social costs and therefore the first best is achieved 
by giving the firm a reward equal to the consumers’ net surplus.14 Later Baron and 
Myerson (1982) presented a model of adverse selection where the regulator could not 
observe cost (see also Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984; Sappington, 1982). In their model the 
regulator’s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers’ 
surplus and the firm’s profit. The optimal policy (transfer and price) is based on stated 
costs and is constrained to nonnegative profits and truth-telling cost reports. They find 
that the second-best price will in general be higher than marginal cost, because part of it 
is given as an incentive to reveal true costs. They also found that, if the firm is given no 
weight in the social welfare function, then the selected price is equal to the highest 
marginal cost. When the firm is given the same weight as consumers, the price is equal to 
expected marginal cost. My model relies primarily on this literature and considers the 
relative weight in the social welfare function as a parameter to be estimated. 
Baron and Besanko (1984a) extended this model introducing the ability of the 
regulator to perform costly audits of the firm costs.15 The ex post observation of costs 
allows introduction of ex ante penalties for misreporting, which (weakly) improves the 
performance of the policies and generates a demand for auditing. They also establish that 
the unit price is independent of the auditing policy and, therefore, the same as the one 
                                                 
14  As a means of solving the equity issue, they propose auctioning the rights to the monopoly. 
15  Also see Townsend (1979) where information can be perfectly verified and Laffont and Tirole (1986) 
who do not consider uncertainty or the demand for auditing. 
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found by Baron and Myerson (1982).16 They show in several situations that auditing 
(strictly) increases expected welfare.  
If the regulatory agency were able to observe the level of invested capital, then 
the optimal pricing policy would lead to over capitalization. According to Besanko 
(1985), “Optimal revenue requirement regulation under asymmetric information makes 
the firm’s output price a non-decreasing function of the amount of capital employed” (p. 
51). When invested capital becomes part of the observed variables, an informational 
value is added to its productive worth. For that reason, the firm distorts its input decision 
to accommodate capital’s new value. Averch and Johnson (1962) obtained this result in a 
rate-of-return regulation framework. But in their case, the optimal allowed rate of return 
is a decreasing function of the amount of capital employed, creating less incentive for 
overcapitalization.17  
Sappington (1983) extended the basic one-output model assuming a separable 
cost function, a one-dimensional technological uncertainty, and unobservable costs. The 
standard results apply and optimal prices deviate from marginal cost to limit the 
informational rent. The regulator induces the firm to choose an inefficient technology for 
at least one of the products. He also found that incentives are fundamentally linked to 
prices as long as the hidden parameter affects marginal costs. This result is due to the 
assumption that costs are not observable. Laffont and Tirole (1993) also studied the 
problem, but allowed for cost observability. Working with a model that allows transfers, 
                                                 
16  Moreover, when the individual-rationality constraint is not binding and the global-incentive-
compatibility condition can be represented by a local condition, the pricing policy is independent of the 
auditing policy. 
17  Klevorick (1966) proposed a graduated rate-of-return regulation, but not as an optimal regulatory policy. 
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they conclude that “optimal pricing requires that each product’s Lerner index be equal to 
the sum of a Ramsey term and an incentive correction” (p. 200). 
2.2.1 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
Some authors have considered the problem of opportunistic behavior in the 
regulator-firm relationship. Examples of moral hazard are exaggeration of costs when 
allowed revenues depend on them, and effort-shirking when costly information is needed 
to make better production decisions. Laffont and Tirole (1986) propose a model where 
the regulator can audit the firm’s costs and the firm can make an effort to reduce cost (see 
also Baron and Besanko, 1986). Also, Sappington (1986) analyzes a model of 
information acquisition. In both models the simultaneous existence of moral hazard and 
adverse selection leads to policies that are quite different from those when only one is 
present. In particular, Besanko and Sappington (1987) state that when both are present 
the “optimal regulatory policy calls for marginal cost pricing, given the effort exerted by 
the firm” (p.36). In this specific case, the distortions brought by the two effects cancel 
out. 
2.2.2 Regulation of Quality 
The regulation of quality may be considered an extension to the literature on 
monopoly and product quality. One of the early efforts to incorporate quality in 
regulation is the work of Spence (1975). He finds that “for any fixed price, the firm sets 
quality too low” (p. 420). But this does not necessarily mean that quality is under-
supplied, because in his model the unregulated monopolist might under- or over-supply 
quality depending on how the price elasticity changes with quality. 
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Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1987), using a modeling approach similar to 
that of Mussa and Rosen (1978), study the effect of minimum quality standards and price 
ceilings in a hidden information environment. They find that with a “price ceiling, the 
monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market,” but for “minimum 
quality standards, the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards 
may exclude some consumers from the market” (p. 743). Lewis and Sappington (1988) 
examine the regulation of verifiable and unverifiable quality, and find that under 
unverifiable quality the regulator will allow prices in excess of marginal cost.18 They also 
show that rent derived by the firm from private information about demand is higher when 
demand is verifiable.19 Laffont and Tirole (1993) present a model that looks at the effect 
of quality on the power of incentive mechanisms. They use a model of moral hazard and 
distinguish between experience and search goods.20 They argue that the incentive to 
reduce costs is in conflict with the provision of quality for experience goods, and that the 
power of the incentive mechanism will then depend on the (relative) importance of 
quality. For a search good, the effect of increasing the perceived cost of providing quality 
is not present because direct sales incentives can be provided. A high concern for quality 
leads to low powered incentive schemes only if quantity and quality are net substitutes. 
2.3 Repeated Interaction and Commitment 
When the regulatory process is characterized by more than one interaction, the 
behavior of the agents will adjust by taking into account the information available in 
                                                 
18  Verifiable quality differs from observable quality in that a court cannot ascertain the latter. 
19  For a more general exposition, see Lewis and Sappington’s (1991) model of procurement. For an 
application to energy conservation, see Lewis and Sappington (1992). 
20  With an experience (search) good, consumers perceive quality after (before) buying it. 
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future interactions. Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) proposed a scheme that would force 
firms to lower prices in order to secure temporary profit. They assume that firms use a 
technology characterized by static and decreasing ray average costs, and that firms 
myopically maximize profit in each period. They conclude that only with the ability to 
observe the firm’s expenditures can the regulator induce the firm to set prices in the 
social interest. However, this result does not take into account long-term strategic 
behavior of the firm. 
In an environment of asymmetric information and multi-period regulation, Baron 
and Besanko (1984b) showed that the optimal contract with commitment is the repetition 
of the static contract. The ability to commit to long-term contracts becomes crucial to 
achieve ex-ante efficiency. However, the importance of non-commitment has been 
highlighted after observing the existence of legal prohibitions, politically unstable 
principals, the lack of knowledge about future conditions (the incomplete contracting 
argument), and the possibility that all agents are better off by renegotiating their 
contracts. Laffont and Tirole (1988) dropped the assumption of long-term commitment 
and assumed perfectly correlated marginal costs to obtain the no-separation result that, 
for any first-period incentive scheme, there exists no fully separating continuation 
equilibrium. 
2.3.1 Yardstick Competition 
A way in which the regulator can diminish the asymmetry of information is by 
comparing information available for multiple firms operating in separated markets. This 
additional information may help reduce the informational rents and induce incentives to 
reduce cost by introducing a competition against a standard set by the most efficient firm. 
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According to Demski and Sappington (1984), even the first-best can be achieved in a 
setting with two risk-neutral firms with correlated costs.21,22 Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) 
considered a model with risk-averse firms and showed how the first-best can be achieved 
as a Nash equilibrium.23 However, when there are differences in the firms that cannot be 
observed by the regulator, the fist-best cannot be implemented (see Shleifer, 1985).  
2.3.2 The Political Economy of Regulation  
In general, the problem of regulation is viewed as a contract between a regulator 
and a firm. This simplification overlooks the existence of other agents affecting the 
results of the regulatory process. The firm, for example, can be viewed as having an 
incentive problem between the owner and the manager and also between the manager and 
other employees. On the other hand, the regulator will usually be an agency that is 
controlled by a congress (or other sections of government), but can also be influenced by 
interest groups (such as the regulated industry or consumers). These hierarchical 
relationships increase the complexity of strategic behavior among agents. 
Stigler (1971) postulated that interest groups choose to influence government at a 
level where their marginal benefit is equal to their marginal cost of organization. He also 
states that influence is more likely in policies where there is a high stake. Also, Becker 
(1983) proposed a model where interest groups exert costly “pressure” to increase the 
chances of obtaining a political favor. Another approach, proposed by the Virginia school 
(Buchanan, 1965; Tollison, 1982; and Tullock, 1967), suggests that politicians or 
bureaucrats have the power to create rents for which the firms will compete through 
                                                 
21  See d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) for a similar solution in the context of revelation of 
preferences for public goods. 
22  See also Cremer and McLean (1985) who worked with a bidding model. 
23  For a model in a context of symmetric ex ante information, see Mookherjee (1984). 
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bribes and kickbacks. At the same time, bureaucrats compete to become rent granters. 
The social cost (deadweight loss) of these activities has to be considered when evaluating 
the benefits of regulation. 
Tirole (1986) proposes a model of collusion where two agents (the regulatory 
agency and the firm), in a 3-level hierarchy, reach an agreement that is detrimental to the 
third agent (congress). This leads to additional inefficiencies because now congress has to 
give additional incentives to avoid the capture of the agency by the firm. According to 
Laffont and Tirole (1991), such a scheme would lead to lower social welfare levels, and 
would force the agency to choose a less powerful incentive scheme, yielding worse cost 
performance. Using a model of hidden information, Spiller (1990) looks at a regulatory 
problem where two principals, congress and the regulated industry, compete for “favors” 
by the regulatory agency. He proposes a testable hypothesis derived from his model: 
“…conditioned on a regulator quitting the commission, the probability of going to work 
(directly or indirectly) for the industry falls with the agency’s budget during the 
regulator’s last period at the agency” (p.88). His empirical analysis applied to the U.S. 
regulatory sector cannot reject the existence of this agency problem. 
2.4 Empirical Studies of Regulation with Asymmetric Information 
Many of these developments in the theoretical literature have not been 
accompanied by empirical studies that test or apply the models developed. Based on these 
studies, only a few have attempted the estimation of the underlying structural models.24 
Testing of the theory of incentives has been done mainly in insurance, financial, and 
labor markets. There have been few attempts to estimate structural models of regulation 
                                                 
24 For a brief review see Salanié (1998). 
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on infrastructure-intensive industries where regulation plays a fundamental role. One of 
the first attempts is the work of Wolak (1994) on water utilities in California. He 
estimates production functions taking into account the presence of private information. 
Using a non-nested test, he finds that a model where only the distribution of the private 
information is observable by the regulator is superior to one with no private information. 
The major effect he finds is a welfare loss to consumers due to reduced output under 
asymmetric information. Another study by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997) estimates cost 
functions that include both a moral hazard and adverse selection variable for the 
Norwegian bus transport industry. Assuming a non sophisticated regulator, they show 
that traditional cost function estimates may produce biased results, which provides a 
possible explanation to overestimated scale economies in regulated industries. Thomas 
(1995) tries to explain the joint use of emission taxes and individual contracts to regulate 
pollution using data from a French water agency. He postulates that individual contracts 
to most efficient firms can improve performance when the effluents are not perfectly 
observed by the regulator, which is the case where the regulator cannot use an optimal 
tax. His estimations allow him to sort different industries according to their abatement 
efficiency and to find that actual pollution taxes are only 50% of the Pigouvian level.  
2.5 Classification of Current Regulatory Mechanisms 
Laffont and Tirole (1986) suggest that current incentive schemes can be classified 
into two groups: those that allow public transfers and those that do not.25 These transfers 
are more common in public enterprises, but are also present in private ones as different 
                                                 
25  This is not a theoretical issue but rather a political one that regulators face when trying to implement a 
regulatory scheme. 
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forms of subsidies. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, these authors suggest 
that there is no significant difference in modeling with or without transfers.26 Another 
pattern used to classify incentive schemes is their incentive power. This is understood as 
the degree of association between the performance of the firm and the compensation it 
gets. So, for example, with respect to cost efficiency, if the compensation a firm receives 
is fixed and relatively independent of the firm’s action, then it will have a high powered 
incentive to reduce costs because there will be a direct relation between the effort exerted 
and its performance. An example of a low powered scheme is a cost-of-service regulation 
where compensation is designed to cover the total cost. A rate-of-return regulation would 
be an intermediate power plan because usually the price adjustment is lagged allowing 
the firm to obtain part of the gains of improving performance. Price caps are usually seen 
as high powered because the firm will get most of the short run gains from reducing 
costs.27  
My work will extend previous studies by considering the effect of regulation on 
quality and the possibility of an imperfect regulator. Also, the regulatory setup that I 
propose differs fundamentally from the ones considered by the studies of Laffont and 
Tirole (1986; 1993), because in one case the regulation involves investment control (as is 
essentially the case with a rate-of-return regulation) and the other allows for direct 
transfers from the regulator. The next section presents a review of the available literature 
devoted to the Chilean Electricity Industry. 
                                                 
26  The results will be different since in the latter case the shadow price depends on the marginal cost of the 
firm and managerial compensation. (See Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
27  Typical implementations adjust prices using (RPI – X) where RPI represents the retail price index and X 
represents a rate of technological change. 
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2.6 Literature on the Chilean Electricity Industry 
The aim of most of the literature on the Chilean electricity industry is to describe 
the system and its evolution, analyze the actual system and its privatization process, and 
investigate outages and the recent crises of the system. Because privatization in Chile was 
done early in the era of privatization, some studies in the literature offer lessons for other 
countries (see Hachette and Luders, 1993; and Luders, 2000). Some studies discuss more 
closely the link between privatization and regulation (see Bitrán and Saéz, 1994; Bitrán 
and Serra, 1994; 1998; Chumacero, Paredes and Sánchez, 2000; Laffont and Tirole, 
1986). Much of this discussion focuses on the requirements of a regulatory body to 
handle the recently privatized industries. One conclusion derived from this literature is 
that the privatization process brought increased efficiency. But it is not apparent who the 
beneficiaries of this gain were. Moreover, according to Bitrán and Serra (1998), because 
the information available to regulators is limited, these benefits where only transmitted to 
consumers when competition was present. According to Muñoz (1992), this is explained, 
in part, by the lack of an adequate regulatory body before and after privatization took 
place. As a result, interest groups could affect their own regulatory framework. 
The official description of the electricity system can be found in CNE (1996), but 
an earlier work by Bernstein (1998) gives a first-hand description of how it was designed 
and what are the economic principles behind the system.28 Other studies criticize the 
policies that were implemented and outline the lessons from regulation of the Chilean 
electric system.29 Among the most common problems mentioned are the lack of 
independence and freedom of choice of the regulatory agency, which makes it prone to 
                                                 
28  Also see Jadresic (1999) for an update on the policies that were implemented. 
29  See, for example, Blanlot (1992), Cano (1997), Basañes, Saavedra and Soto (1999) and Soto (1999) for 
an institutional perspective. 
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capture and political influence. Also, the lack of resources and the resulting asymmetry of 
information impede an adequate job by the regulator. Another criticism is that the policy 
caused increased costs due to regulation and resolution of conflicts. In particular, Paredes 
(no date) suggests that efficiency gains from privatization are about the same as the costs 
of regulation for electricity distribution.  
Some studies present a comparison of the Chilean experience with that of other 
countries. Spiller and Martorell (1996) contrast the relative success of Chile in its 
privatization process with other South American countries.30 They suggest that the main 
difference stems from the creation of regulatory institutions previous to divestiture. 
Galal, et al. (1994) is one of the few studies that attempts an empirical evaluation 
of the welfare effects of divestiture of some of the generation and distribution companies 
in Chile. In the case of the main distribution company, they find that consumers and 
shareholders were made better-off, but taxpayers and government ended up worse-off 
with the divestiture process.  
A few studies have focused on specific segments of the electricity sector. Beyer 
(1988) looks at the privatization of the major distribution company of the country and 
concludes that there is not enough evidence to support or reject its privatization. Soto 
(1998) analyzes the problem of pricing in the transmission system.31 Halabí (2000) uses a 
stochastic efficiency frontier approach to estimate efficiency measures and other 
parameters for the hydroelectric generation industry. She finds minor increases in 
productivity and the existence of market power in the generation segment of the market. 
                                                 
30  For a more recent comparison with other Latin American countries, see Hennemeyer (1999). Also see 
Rudnik (1997) who compares regulatory laws and institutions in Chile, Peru and Venezuela. 
31  See also Díaz and Soto (1999) who examine open access issues in the transmission and distribution 
segments. 
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Rozas (1999a) examines consumer rights from a legal perspective and concludes that, 
even after the new law of 1998 (Decreto Supremo N° 327, Ministerio de Minería, 
Septiembre de 1998), the right of consumers to receive adequate quality of service is not 
guaranteed. This would mean that distribution companies are not fully subjected to 
consumer’s complaints and, therefore, a gap may exist between the quality provided and 
that desired with the consequent loss of welfare. If this is true, the burden of quality 
control relies mainly on the regulator’s decisions. 
More recent discussion has centered on the outages of 1998-1999 in Chile by 
trying to explain and extract lessons from the crises (see Bernstein, 1999; Díaz, Galetovic 
and Soto, 2000; and Rozas, 1999b). A few studies that discuss the use of outage cost in 
the pricing system.32 Little work has been done on the impact of privatization and 
deregulation of the electric power sector on the environment.33  
Westley (1992) compares different studies of econometric estimation of 
electricity demands in Latin America and the U.S. He defines a minimal set of standards 
necessary for a demand study to be considered acceptable. Unfortunately, only a few 
studies meet these standards and none of them are for Chile.34 
2.7 Conclusions to Chapter 2 
After reviewing this literature, it is clear that there have been only a few attempts 
to evaluate the performance of the regulatory system since the Chilean privatization 
                                                 
32  Serra and Fierro (1997) present the empirical estimation of outage costs. Bernstein and Agurto (1992) 
present the methodology used by the regulator to include outage costs in the pricing system. Serra 
(1997) proposes a pricing system based on the Chilean model, but with voluntary reductions in 
consumption in the presence of outages. 
33  For a description of the problem, see Blum (1996). A seminar by CEPAL (Altomonte, 1999) presents 
the view of the agents involved in the problem. 
34 A more detailed review of the econometric estimation of electricity demand functions is presented in 
section 5.2 of Chapter 5. 
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process. These attempts have been rather limited in scope and have mainly focused on the 
advantages of privatization. The studies with more analytic content that have examined 
the regulatory process have done it without (explicitly) using economic models or 
econometric estimation. The studies on the distribution segment have also been mainly 
descriptive, very limited in scope, or focused on estimating benefits from privatization. 
Though the diagnostics done by some of these studies are consistent with the general 
framework of this dissertation, no solid evidence is presented to support their statements. 
The main questions that remain unanswered by this literature are as follows. What 
is the effect of having a regulator that is biased in its preferences? How significant are the 
asymmetries of information in the regulatory outcome? How have regulated prices been 
linked in practice to the quality of the service provided? These are some of the questions 




3 THE MODELS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I develop regulation models that use the stylized facts of the 
problem described in the previous chapter. The models developed here represent four 
basic situations that could be representative of a regulated monopolist. I have tried to 
capture two important issues that arise when regulating a monopolist. First, there is the 
problem of the number of instruments being used to regulate the firm. I consider this 
problem as one where the regulator sets a (maximum) price and possibly also a 
(minimum) quality in regulating the monopolist. That is, I consider two cases: one where 
price and quality are regulated and the other where only price is directly regulated. The 
latter case assumes that the regulator is aware that both quantity and quality affect 
consumer welfare, but for some exogenous reason does not use quality as a regulatory 
instrument. The reasons why this might be the case are many, varying from technical 
difficulties in implementing an index for quality, to the political viability of such an 
instrument. In many cases, quality might be observable but not necessarily enforceable, 
which would limit its use in a regulatory scheme. I do not consider the case where there 
are costs associated with the inclusion of an additional regulatory instrument such as 
quality.35 
Second, I consider the problem of asymmetric information. In one case, both 
agents, the regulator and the firm, have access to all information. In the other case, the 
regulator has imperfect information about the costs of the firm. In the latter case, the 
                                                 
35  An extension to this model would be to consider non-constant costs by, for example, having 




regulator only knows the cost function up to a parameter, sometimes called the efficiency 
parameter, which distinguishes firms according to their cost. Thus, two scenarios are 
used: one under symmetric information and the other under asymmetric information. As 
is common in the literature, it is assumed that the principal knows the distribution of the 
efficiency parameter. 
Combining the number of instruments considered for regulation and the 
alternative informational structures gives rise to the four models to be developed.  
3.2 Functions and Their Properties 
I will first define the functions used in the models, establish their properties, and 
make assumptions about their curvature. I will use a gross willingness to pay function 
V(p,s) where p and s are price and quality, respectively. The relationship between this 
function and the derived demand Q(p,s) is given by 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).pV p s Q p s dp pQ p s
∞= +∫ % %  
It should be noted that Q(p,s) represents the total amount consumed in the market. Thus 
V(p,s) is an aggregated function. The demand function is assumed to be thrice 
differentiable with 
 Q(p,s) > 0, (3.2.1) 
 Qp(p,s) < 0, (3.2.2) 
 Qs(p,s) > 0, (3.2.3) 
 Qss(p,s) < 0, (3.2.4) 
where, as usual, Qi(.) represents the derivative of the function with respect to variable i. 




according to assumption (3.2.3), and at a decreasing rate, according to assumption (3.2.4). 
These two assumptions imply decreasing marginal willingness to pay for quality, as is 
evident from  
 ( , )ss s sspV Q p s dp pQ
∞= +∫ % %  (3.2.5) 
I also assume weak complementarity between the consumption of electricity and 
its quality (Mäler, 1974), which rules out changes in welfare due to changes in quality 
when Q = 0. 
Consumer surplus, K(p,s,T) = V(p,s) – p·Q – T , can then be defined as 36 
 ( , , ) ( , )pK p s T Q p s dp T
∞= −∫ % %  
where T represents a fixed transfer payment independent of the quality or quantity 
consumed. Conditions (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) assure standard assumptions applicable to 
consumer surplus: Kp = –Q < 0 and Kpp = –Qp > 0. 
The cost function C(q,s,q) represents the minimum cost of producing q units with 
a quality level of s ¥ 0 for a firm of type q. To represent the problem in the context of an 
electricity market, q is taken by the firm as determined by consumers in response to the 
firm’s actions. Each consumer at each point in time determines how much to consume 
depending on the price and quality, Q(p,s). Depending on the case, quality (s) may or 
may not be chosen by the firm. The role of q is explained further in the asymmetric 
information section, but is assumed exogenous to the firm. The cost function is assumed 
to be thrice differentiable, convex in (p,s), and to have the following curvature properties: 
 Cq(q,s,q ) > 0, (3.2.6) 
                                                 
36  I use the term “consumer surplus” to fix ideas, but the expression can also represent compensating or 





 Cs(q,s,q ) > 0, (3.2.7) 
 Cqq(q,s,q ) > 0, (3.2.8) 
 Css(q,s,q ) > 0, (3.2.9) 
 Cqs(q,s,q ) > 0, (3.2.10) 
 Cq(q,s,q ) > 0. (3.2.11) 
Assumptions (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) assume cost is increasing in both quantity and quality. 
Assumptions (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) are imposed by convexity of the cost function in (q,s). 
Assumption (3.2.10) presumes that marginal cost is increasing in quality, which is very 
likely in the electricity industry because reliability, for example, is known to require 
additional investments and increased operational costs. Assumption (3.2.11) is arbitrary 
and could be set in the opposite direction without loss of generality. This condition only 
plays a role in the asymmetric information models. 
In the following two sections, I present two models of regulation under symmetric 
information. The first considers the case of price and quality regulation and the second 
considers the case of price-only regulation. The general setting is one where there is a 
regulator who fixes the level of the regulatory instrument, then a firm chooses the level of 
the remaining variables to maximize its profit, and then consumers decide the amount 
consumed depending on price and quality. In the first case, the regulator sets price and 
quality, and then consumers decide quantity given price and quality. Here the firm 
maximizes profit only by minimizing its cost of producing a given quantity and quality. 
In the second case, the regulator sets only the price, then the firm decides on a profit-




The price set by the regulator takes the form of a two part tariff composed of the 
per unit price p and the fixed transfer payment T. This type of pricing is commonplace in 
electricity and other services where fixed costs are significant. Because q was defined as 
the aggregate quantity, p·q + T represents total revenue collected by the firm where T is 
the total fixed transfer collected from all clients served by the firm. 
The regulator is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of producer and consumer 
surplus where producer surplus is given by the firm’s profit function, 
 π(p,s,T,q ) = T + p Q(p,s) – C(Q(p,s),s,q ). (3.2.12) 
3.3  Price and Quality Regulation under Symmetric Information 
Suppose the regulator chooses price, quality, and the transfer payment by solving  
 maxT,p,s   W*(p,s,T,q ) = aK(p,s,T) + (1 – a) π(p,s,T,q )) 
 s.t.: K(p,s,T) ¥ K0, 
 π(p,s,T,q ) ¥ π0. 
where K0 and π0 represent reservation levels of surplus for consumers and producers, 
respectively, and are assumed to be nonnegative so that participation is voluntary; and q 
is the efficiency parameter that in this case is assumed to be common knowledge.37 Using 
the definitions of consumer and producer surplus, this objective function can be rewritten 
as 
 W*(p,s,T,q ) = aV(p,s) – (1 – a) C(Q(p,s),s,q ) + (1 – 2a)(T+p Q(p,s)), (3.3.1) 
and the constraints become 
 V(p,s) − p Q(p,s) −  K0 ¥ T, (3.3.2) 
 C(Q(p,s),s,q ) − p Q(p,s) − π0 § T. (3.3.3) 
                                                 




When the regulator has symmetric preferences for consumers and producers 
represented by a = 0.5, T can be set to any value that satisfies the restrictions without 
affecting the optimum and, hence, the problem for the regulator becomes 
 maxp.s  ½ {V(p,s) − C(Q(p,s),s,q )}, 
for which first order conditions (FOC) and assumption (3.2.2) imply38,39 
 p = Cq, (3.3.4) 
 Ks = Cs. (3.3.5) 
These conditions state the regular result that, under perfect information and in the 
absence of a “biased” regulator, quantity and quality will be set at a level where their 
social marginal benefits is equated to their social marginal costs.40  
 The second order conditions (SOC) for this problem are Wpp < 0, Wss < 0, 
and WppWss - (Wps)2 > 0 where 
 W(p,s,q ) = V(p,s) − C(Q(p,s),s,q ). 
Upon substituting from FOC, 
 Wpp = Qp − Cqq Qp2, 
 Wss = Kss − Cqq Qs2 − 2 CqsQs − Css, 
 Wps = − CqqQpQs − CqsQp. 
These conditions are met by assumptions (3.2.2)-(3.2.4) and (3.2.6)-(3.2.10). By the 
definition of consumer surplus and assumptions (3.2.3) and (3.2.4),  
 ( , , ) ( , ) 0s spK p s T Q p s dp
∞= >∫ % % , 
 ( , , ) ( , ) 0ss sspK p s T Q p s dp
∞= <∫ % % . 
                                                 
38  Note that in these expressions the arguments of the functions have been omitted to save space. 
39  The FOC with respect to quality implies Vs = CqQs + Cs, which after replacing the left hand side with Vs 
= Ks + pQs, and upon substitution of (3.3.4) yields (3.3.5). 




Note that these assumptions do not impose a specific sign on Vps.  
Once p and s have been chosen according to the FOC, T can take any value that 
satisfies 
 V(p1,s1) − p1Q(p1,s1) − K0 ¥ T ¥ C(Q(p1,s1),s1,q ) − p1 Q(p1,s1) − π0, 
where p1 and s1 represent the optimal price and quality, respectively. Any such T satisfies 
the reservation value constraints. 
The case where the regulator favors consumers is represented by a > 0.5 and (1 − 
2a) < 0. Because the first two terms of (3.3.1) are independent of T, the regulator chooses 
the minimum T allowed by the restrictions. Therefore, the transfer is given by 
  T = C(Q(p,s),s,q ) − pQ(p,s) − π0,  (3.3.6) 
which means that producer surplus will be set at the reservation level by the regulator. 
Replacing the value of T in (3.3.1) the regulator’s problem can thus be restated as 
 maxp,s  a {V(p,s) − C(Q(p,s),s,q )} − (1 – 2a)π0, 
where (3.3.2) is not binding assuming a feasible solution exists, and (3.3.3) is binding and 
thus imposed by substitution in the objective function. This problem is equivalent, aside 
from a multiplicative constant, to the problem where a = 0.5. Thus, the solution is the 
same except for T, which in this case is given by 
 T = C(Q(p1,s1),s1,q ) − p1Q(p1,s1) − π0. 
If the regulator favors producers, then a < 0.5 and (1− 2a) > 0. Therefore the 
regulator chooses the maximum T allowed by the restrictions. Therefore, the transfer is 
given by  




which means that consumer surplus will be set at the reservation level by the regulator. 
Replacing this value of T in (3.3.1), the regulator’s problem can be restated as 
 maxp,s  (1−a){V(p,s) − C(Q(p,s),s,q )} −  (1− 2a)K0, 
where (3.3.3) is not binding assuming a feasible solution exists, and (3.3.2) is binding and 
thus imposed by substitution in the objective function. This problem obviously has the 
same first- and second-order conditions as the case where a ≥ 0.5 aside from a 
multiplicative constant. Once p and s have been chosen according to (3.3.4) and (3.3.5), T 
is set so that 
 T = V(p1,s1) − p1 Q(p1,s1) −  K0. 
In this model, a, which reflects the preference or “bias” of the regulator, does not 
have a distorting effect on the outcome. The “first best” is reached independent of 
regulator bias. The difference is in the distribution, which is affected in extremes 
depending on the direction of bias. Thus, I have shown how, under perfect information 
with the use of two instruments, regulatory bias does not affect the efficiency of the 
outcome, but only the allocation of surplus within the bounds set by reservation values.  
3.4 Price Regulation under Symmetric Information 
In the case where the regulator only sets the price, a monopolist chooses the 
quality level to maximize profits given price, type (q ), and the size of transfer payment. I 
start with the problem of the monopolist who takes as given the price set by the regulator. 
Later I solve the problem where the regulator considers the optimal response function of 
the monopolist. The problem for the firm is 
 maxs p(s;p,T,q ).  (3.4.1) 




 ps = p Qs - (Cq Qs + Cs) = 0. (3.4.2) 
This means that the firm will set quality so that marginal revenue equates to the marginal 
cost of providing an additional unit of quality, which is composed of the direct cost of 
providing quality and the indirect cost due to the change in quantity demanded. The SOC 
is given by 
 pss = p Qss - (Cqq Qs2 + Cq Qss+ 2 Cqs Qs + Css) < 0, (3.4.3) 
and is met under the convexity of the cost function and assumption (3.2.4) because p – Cq 
> 0. Thus, define the firm’s profit function as p*(p,T,q ) = maxs p(s;p,T,q ).  
A comparative static analysis can be used to find the effect of the regulated price 







= = −  (3.4.4) 
where psp = Qs + (p - Cq)Qps - CqqQpQs - CqsQp. Using the FOC, this implies that if Qps 
> 0 then Sp > 0, or more generally, that Sp < (>) 0 as Qps < (>) (CqqQpQs + CqsQp - Qs)/(p 
- Cq). The former means that if demand is such that increasing quality has a positive 
effect on the marginal amount demanded, then the quality chosen by the monopolist is 
increasing in the price set by the regulator. 
Next, let  
 S(p,q ) = argmaxs p(s;p,T,q )  (3.4.5) 
represent the monopolist’s optimal choice in (3.4.1) and consider the regulator’s problem 
if the regulator knows that the monopolist uses this rule. Replacing quality with the 
monopolist’s choice function for quality, the regulator’s problem becomes  
 maxT,p a K(p,S,T) + (1 – a) p(p,S,T,q ) (3.4.6) 




where the arguments of S(p,q ) are suppressed for ease of notation, and K0 and p0 again 
represent reservation levels of surplus for consumers and producers, respectively. 
Alternatively, using the definition of K(.) and p(.), the regulator’s problem can be 
expressed as 
 maxT,p aV(p,S) – (1 – a) C(Q(p,S),S,q ) + (1 – 2a)(T+ p Q(p,S))  
 s.t.:  V(p,S) − pQ(p,S) − K0 ¥ T (3.4.7) 
 C(Q(p,S),S,q ) − p Q(p,S) − p0 § T. (3.4.8) 
Again with symmetric regulator preferences, a = 0.5, T can be set to any value 
that satisfies the restrictions without affecting the optimum. The problem for the regulator 
becomes 
 maxp ½{V(p,S) − C(Q(p,S),S,q )}, (3.4.9) 
for which the FOC together with (3.4.2) implies 
 (p – Cq) Qp + KsSp = 0, (3.4.10) 
and the SOC requires 
Qp + (p – Cq)(Qpp + QpsSp) - Qp(Cqq(Qp+ QsSp)+ CqsSp) + KpsSp + KssSp2 + KsSpp < 0. 
This condition is assumed to hold so that W(p,S,q ) = V(p,S) − C(Q(p,S),S,q ) is concave 
in p.41 
Once p has been chosen according to (3.4.10), T can take any value that satisfies 
 V(p2,s2) − p2 Q(p2,s2) − K0 ¥ T ¥ C(Q(p2,s2),s2,q ) − p2 Q(p2,s2) − p0, 
where p2 and s2 ª S(p2,q ) represent the equilibrium price and quality for this case. 
                                                 
41 In the standard monopoly pricing problem, where π = pQ(p) –C(Q(p)), the FOC is Q + (p – Cq)Qp = 0 
and the SOC is (p – Cq)Qpp  + 2Qp – CqqQp2 < 0. That is, the standard monopoly problem requires Qpp < 
(CqqQp2 – 2Qp)/(p – Cq). Thus, Qpp can be either positive or negative but within limits that depend on the 
properties of both demand and cost. Just as the standard monopoly pricing literature does not find careful 
scrutiny of these conditions fruitful, neither is careful scrutiny of the SOC in this problem interesting other 
than to determine a condition that excludes nonsensical cases. The parallel requirement in this problem is 
Qpp + QpsSp < [Qp(Cqq(Qp+ QsSp) + CqsSp) - Qp - KpsSp - KssSp2 - KsSpp] /(p – Cq)< 0, which is an 




If the regulator’s preferences favor consumers, then a > 0.5 and (1 − 2a) < 0 
implies that the regulator will choose the minimum T within the limits allowed by the 
restrictions, which in turn implies that the transfer will be T = C(Q(p,S),S,q ) − pQ(p,S) − 
p0. Thus, producer surplus will be set at the reservation level by the regulator. The 
regulator’s problem for this case can then be restated as 
 maxp  a (V(p,S) − C(Q(p,S),S,q )) − (1 – 2a)p0, 
where (3.4.7) is not binding and (3.4.8) is imposed by substitution in the objective 
function. Because the FOC of this problem is the same as for the previous problem, i.e., 
(3.4.10) applies, the optimal solution will be the same except for T, which is now given 
by 
 T = C(Q(p2,s2),s2,q ) − p2Q(p2,s2) − p0. 
If the regulator’s preferences favor producers, then a < 0.5 and (1 − 2a) > 0 
implies that the regulator will choose the minimum T allowed by the restrictions. 
Therefore, the transfer will be T = V(p,S) − pQ(p,S) − K0. Thus, consumer surplus will be 
set at the reservation level by the regulator. The regulator’s problem for this case can then 
be restated as 
 maxp  (1−a) (V(p,S) − C(Q(p,S),S,q )) − (1–2a)K0, 
where (3.4.8) is not binding and (3.4.7) is imposed by substitution in the objective 
function. Again, because the FOC of this problem is the same as (3.4.9), the optimal 
solution will be the same except for T, which is now given by 
 T = V(p2,s2) − p2 Q(p2,s2) − K0. 
From (3.4.2), if only price is regulated, then quality is chosen by equating its 




pQs). This is in contrast with price and quality regulation where using (3.3.5), replacing 
with Cs = Vs − pQs and using (3.3.4), yields Vs = CqQs + Cs, which implies that marginal 
cost is equated to the marginal willingness to pay for quality.  
In both cases the marginal cost of providing quality has not only a direct effect 
but also an indirect effect that works through the change in quantity. Also, when only 
price is regulated, it is determined by (3.4.10). Compared to the rule used when both 
price and quality are regulated, (p – Cq) Qp = 0, it is clear that price will not equate to 
marginal cost unless price has no effect on quality or quality has no effect on consumer 
surplus, which are uninteresting cases.  
Comparing price and quality regulation with price-only regulation, it is possible to 
identify three outcomes depending on the signs of Sp and  
 ( )qqp qq p qq s qs p
dC
C C Q C Q C S
dp
= = + + , (3.4.11) 
the latter of which can be obtained by a comparative static analysis of equilibrium 
marginal cost under price-only regulation. This expression states that the impact of a 
change in price on marginal cost can be decomposed into the impact it has through a 
change in quantity (CqqQp) and the impact it has through quality (Cqq (Qs + Cqs)Sp). 
Because Sp < 0 implies Cqp < 0, (3.4.10) and (3.3.4) imply that p1 > p2, which then 
translates into s1 < s2 and q1 < q2 where qi ª Q(pi,si) and, as above, xi represents the 
outcome in case i (i = 1 for price-quality regulation and i = 2 for price-only regulation). If 
Sp > 0 and Cqp < 0, then p1 < p2, which in this case implies that s1 < s2. If also Sp > 0 and 
Cqp > 0, then p1 > p2, which implies that s1 > s2. Table 3.1 indicates which of the two 
types of regulations, price-quality or price-only, have higher prices, quality, and quantity 




price-only regulation unless Sp > 0 and Cqp < 0, in which case the opposite is true. That 
is, price and quality are lower with price-only regulation when –CqqQp > Sp (Cqq Qs + 
Cqs), i.e., when the negative of the impact of price on cost through quantity is greater than 
the impact of price on cost through quality. 
Table 3.1. Main Results From Symmetric Information Regulationa 
Sign of Sp Sign of Cqp Highest Price Highest Quality Highest Quantity
Sp > 0 Cqp > 0 P&Q reg. P&Q reg. Indeterminate  
Sp > 0 Cqp < 0 P-only reg. P-only reg. Indeterminate 
Sp < 0 Cqp < 0 P&Q reg. P-only reg. P-only reg. 
a “P&Q reg.” means price and quality regulation; “P-only reg.” means price only regulation;  
“Indeterminate” means quantity is not clearly higher in either of the two types of regulations 
3.5 Conclusions for Regulation with Symmetric Information 
From the analysis of the price and quality regulatory problem under symmetric 
information I find that, independent of the number of instruments available for regulation, 
having a “biased” regulator does not affect the efficiency of the outcome. That is, it does 
not matter whether the regulator can set price and quality or only price. Efficiency will be 
the same irrespective of the bias of the regulator. Therefore with symmetric information, 
the preference of the regulator does not affect the efficiency of the outcome, but only the 
distribution of surplus between consumers and producer. 
I have also shown that it is theoretically possible for a regulator to achieve the 
first best when it has the ability to set price and quality under symmetric information. 
This is achieved by setting price equal to the marginal cost and setting quality so that the 
marginal benefit of quality is equal to its marginal cost, as in equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5). 
This is no longer the case when the regulator can only set price and quality is chosen 
instead by the monopolist. The regulator’s inability to set quality leads to an inefficient 




negative of the impact of price on cost through quantity is greater than the impact of price 
on cost through quality, as implied by equation (3.4.11). 
3.6 Price and Quality Regulation under Asymmetric Information 
The models developed in this section and the next follow the mechanism design 
literature and assume that the cost function is perfectly known by the firm but is known 
by the regulator only up to an efficiency parameter (q ).  
The methodology first defines the requirement for an implementable decision, and 
then incorporates the individual rationality (IR) constraint in the objective function to 
search for an optimal mechanism (see Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984; or Mirrlees, 1971). I 
first analyze the case of joint price and quality regulation. The next section considers the 
case of price-only regulation. 
In addition to function properties assumed in the previous sections, I make the 
following assumptions. 
Assumption 1. The regulator only knows the distribution of q, represented by 
( )F θ  on support 0 1[ , ]θ θ θ∈ . The associated (prior) density 
function, ( )f θ , is assumed to be differentiable and have 
0( ) 0f θ > . 
Assumption 2.  Cqq > 0 and Csq  > 0 " q, s, and θ. 
Assumption 3.  Reservation utility is independent of type: ( )π θ π≡ . 




Assumption 5.  Cqqq ≥ 0, Cqsq ≥ 0, and Wps ≤ -WppQs.42 
Assumption 6.  2( ) ( ) ( ) 1F f fθ θ θ′ ≤ . 
Assumption 7.  * * *0, 0, 0p p ppθ θθ θπ π π≥ ≤ ≤ . 
 
This set of assumptions guarantee that the problems are well defined and that a 
solution exists in each case. Assumption 1 reduces the problem of asymmetric 
information to one where there is only uncertainty about the exact realization of the 
firm’s type, and not about the distribution of types. This assumption is standard in the 
mechanism design literature (Mirrlees, 1971; Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Assumption 2 
states that the marginal cost of output and marginal cost of quality are increasing with 
type. In other words, as a firm is less efficient, its marginal costs increase. Assumption 3 
is standard in the mechanism design literature and is an appropriate assumption for the 
electricity sector.43 Assumptions 4 to 7 are sufficient but not necessary conditions that 
guarantee SOC. Extreme behavior would likely be observed if they fail. Assumption 4 
requires the marginal effect of type on the cost function is convex in price and quality. 
Assumption 5 imposes specific signs on third order derivatives of the cost function. 
Assumption 6 is standard in the mechanism design literature and distributions as general 
as the Beta distribution will meet this condition. This means that the distribution of firm 
types could be uniform, or concentrated at one end or the other of the distribution, or 
have a central concentration. Assumption 7 requires the marginal effect of price on the 
profit function is non-decreasing in type. 
                                                 
42  Note that this condition amounts to having Vps- Cqs < - z(a)F(q )/f(q )Cqqs which is satisfied when Vps §  
0 , Cqs ¥ 0 and Cqqs § 0 (or if Cqqs is very small). 
43  The reservation utility may be dependent on size, e.g., on the number of clients, but not on intrinsic 
efficiency of the firm. Since this condition is necessary for voluntary participation, it is relevant at the ex 




3.6.1 Implementable Decisions with Price and Quality Regulation 
By definition, the price and quality (p, s) set by the regulator are implementable 
decisions if there exists a transfer (T) such that the allocation (p(q ), s(q ), T(q )) satisfies 
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, 
       p(p(q ),s(q ),T(q ),q ) ¥ p(p(q *),s(q *),T(q *),q ) for all (q,q *) ∈ [q0,q1] μ [q0,q1]. (3.6.1) 
If p(q ) and s(q ) are piecewise continuously differentiable, a necessary condition 
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. (3.6.2) 
Because p(p,s,T,q ) ª pq(p,s) – C(Q(p,s),s),q ) + T, it follows that 1Tπ = . Therefore 
(3.6.2) can be rewritten as  
 ppq dp/dq  + psq ds/dq  ¥ 0. (3.6.3) 
If p(q ) is non-decreasing and s(q ) is non-increasing (monotonicity), condition 
(3.6.3) is met under Assumption 2, which guarantees that ppq > 0 and psq < 0. In this case, 
the single-crossing condition applies to the two-dimensional decision space for (p,s).45 
The intuitive interpretation of this condition is that the marginal rate of substitution 
between each decision and the transfer is affected in a systematic way by the firm’s type.  
Following Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), a sufficient condition for 
implementability is reached under the single-crossing condition and a boundary behavior 
condition, 
" k = (p, s) $ K0 and K1 such that  0 1
/
/







 uniformly over p, s, T and q, 
                                                 
44  The proof of this result is given by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).  
45  This condition is also known as the constant sign or Spence-Mirrlees condition. In the case here, it takes 




that guarantees existence of a solution to a differential equation. Intuitively, this means 
that the marginal rate of substitution between the price and the transfer, and between 
quality and the transfer, does not increase too fast when the transfer increases. This 
condition is trivially met because p (p,s,T,q ) is linear and additive in T. 
3.6.2 Optimal Mechanism Design with Price and Quality Regulation 
A feasible mechanism is one that is implementable and satisfies the individual 
rationality (IR) condition. To incorporate this constraint, a regular assumption in the 
literature is that the reservation utility is independent of type (Assumption 3). This makes 
the IR condition take the following form, 
 ( ) [ ]0 1( ), ( ), ( ), ,p s Tπ θ θ θ θ π θ θ θ≥ ∀ ∈ , (3.6.4) 
where π  represents the reservation utility of the firm, which is the analog of p0 of the 
previous section.  
The firm’s profit function in (3.2.12) is linear in T and thrice differentiable Again 
the regulator’s objective function is given by  
 W*(p,s,T,q ) = a K(p,s,T) + (1 – a) π(p,s,T,q ),  
which after substituting the definitions of consumer and producer surplus yields (3.3.1), 
which is also linear in T. 
The regulator’s maximization problem is then to maxp,s,T Eq{W*(p,s,T,q )} subject 
to monotonicity and the IR condition in equation (3.6.4). For the models with incomplete 
information, I am only concerned with cases where a ≥ ½, thus ensuring a nonnegative 
consumer surplus for any outcome. From the assumption of an independent-of-type 
reservation utility (Assumption 3) and (3.6.4), IR must be satisfied only at q  = q1 and will 




 ( )1 1 1 1( ), ( ), ( ),p s Tπ θ θ θ θ π= . (3.6.5) 
From (3.2.12), T = p(p,s,T,q ) - pQ+ C(Q,s,q ). Thus, the regulator’s objective 
function for known θ can be rewritten as  
 W*(p,s,T,q ) = aV(p,s) -  (1-a) C(Q,s,q ) + (1-2a) (p(p,s,T,q ) + C(Q,s,q ) ) 
 = a (V(p,s) - C(Q,s,q )) + (1-2a) p(p,s,T,q ). (3.6.6) 
Following Mirrlees (1971), the envelope theorem and the IR condition in equation 
(3.6.5) yield a producer surplus function independent of the transfer, 
 ( ) 1** *( ), ( ), ( )p s C dθθ θπ θ θ θ π θ θ= + ∫ % % %  (3.6.7) 
where ( )( )*( ) ( ), ( ) , ( ),C C Q p s sθ θ θ θ θ≡ .46 
To consider the case where the regulator has only statistical rather than specific 
knowledge about firm efficiency, substituting (3.6.7) into the regulator’s objective 
function (3.6.6), and taking expectations with respect to the distribution of efficiency, 




( ), ( )
{ [ ( ) ( )] (1 2 )[ ( ) ]} ( )max
p s
V C C d dFθ θθ θ θα θ θ α π θ θ θ
⋅ ⋅
− + − +∫ ∫ % % %  
  (3.6.8) 
 s.t.:  p(q1) ≥  p(q2), and  s(q1) ≤  s(q2) " q1>q2. (monotonicity)  
 
where *( ) ( ( ), ( ))V V p sθ θ θ≡ . 
Integrating by parts, the last term in the objective function becomes 
                                                 
46  Note that ** ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ), ( ), ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ), )p s max p s Tθπ θ θ θ π θ θ θ θ=  where θ and θ̂  represent the true and announced 
types, respectively. The FOC for this problem can then be replaced in the FOC of 
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and thus the objective function of problem (3.6.8) becomes 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1
0
( )ˆ ( , , ) ( , ) , , (1 2 ) , , ( )
( )




θθ α θ α θ θ
θ
⎡ ⎤
= − + −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
∫ , 
where the constant term has been eliminated for simplicity. 
The problem can now be written as , ˆmax  ( ( , , ))p s E W p sθ θ  subject to 
monotonicity. To find the solution to this problem, I first find the solution to the problem 
without taking into account the monotonicity constraint, and then determine whether the 
solution satisfies the stated conditions in (3.6.8).  
The solution to this relaxed program, as it is called in the mechanism design 
literature, can be found from the FOC, ˆ 0pW =  and ˆ 0sW = . Expanding and rearranging 
yields the conditions47 
 0 1




α θ θ θ θ
α θ
−
= − ∀ ∈ , and (3.6.9) 
 0 1
(1 2 ) ( ) [ , ]
( )s s s
FK C C
f θ
α θ θ θ θ
α θ
−
= − ∀ ∈ . (3.6.10) 
Comparing these conditions with the ones obtained under symmetric information, 
(3.3.4) and (3.3.5), these are equivalent except for the second right-hand-terms. Under 
                                                 
47  Note that ( )( , ), ,s sC C Q p s sθ θ θ≡  represents the partial derivative with respect to its second and third 




Assumption 2, these terms are negative for a > ½. Thus, in contrast to (3.3.4) and (3.3.5), 
p > Cq and Ks > Cs. Thus, if the regulator places more weight on consumers (as with a 
“biased” regulator), prices and qualities will be different under asymmetric information. 
But when the regulator places the same weight on consumers and producers (a = 0.5), the 
results under asymmetric information are the same as under symmetric information.48  
Note also that, when conditions (3.6.9) and (3.6.10) are evaluated at the most 
efficient type (q0), the symmetric information conditions in (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) are again 
reached because F(q0) = 0. This result is known in the literature as “no distortion at the 
top.” Note that the SOC hold by the concavity of ˆ ( , , ) W p s θ in (p,s) and Assumption 4. 
3.6.3 When is the Relaxed Program Legitimate for Price-Quality Regulation? 
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the monotonicity constraint can be ignored if ( )p θ  
is non-decreasing and ( )s θ  is non-increasing. To check if the solution meets these 
conditions, total differentiation of the FOC in (3.6.9) and (3.6.10) yields 
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By SOC, the denominators of these expressions are negative. To examine the 
signs of the numerators, SOC also imply 
 ( )2 2( )ˆ ( ) 0( )pp p qq p qq p q pp




= − + + < , 
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where z(a) = (1-2a) /a  §  0 because  ½ § a § 1. The signs of 
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+ − + −Φ +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥
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, 
where 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F f fθ θ θ θ′Φ =  are determined by the SOC and Assumptions 2, 4, 5 and 
6. In particular, ˆ 0pW θ ≥ , ˆ 0sW θ ≤ and ˆ 0psW ≥ . Therefore, using (3.6.11) and (3.6.12), 
( )p θ  is non-decreasing and ( )s θ  is non-increasing.  
3.6.4 Results with Price and Quality Regulation 
The main result of this section is a set of conditions that characterize the 
equilibrium levels of price and quality. Comparing the solution under asymmetric 
information in equations (3.6.9) and (3.6.10) to those obtained under symmetric 
information in (3.3.4) and (3.3.5), the difference lies in the additional terms, 
( )( ) ( ) / ( ) ,iz F f C θα θ θ  with i = q, s, respectively. These are both negative when a > 0.5 
by Assumption 2. Therefore, p3 > Cq(q3, s3, q ) and Ks(p3, s3) > Cs(q3, s3, q ) " q œ [q0, q1] 
where (p3, s3) are the asymmetric equilibrium levels of price and quality and q3 = Q(p3, 
s3). By comparison, for the symmetric information, p1 = Cq(q1, s1, q ) and Ks(p1, s1) = 




under regulation with symmetric information and q1 = Q(p1, s1). Depending on the cost 
and value functions, all of the following results are possible: both price and quality 
increase or decrease jointly, price increases and quality decreases, price increases and 
quality remains the same, or quality decreases and price remains the same. 
3.7  Price Regulation under Asymmetric Information 
Consider next the case where the regulator only sets price and the firm is free to 
choose quality. The process is abstracted as a game where the firm first learns its type, 
then the regulator sets the price, and then the firm chooses the level of quality to provide. 
This level will, of course, be the minimum allowed unless it has an effect on quantity 
demanded (i.e. Qs ∫ 0). I solve the problem using backward induction: first the problem 
of the firm is solved, obtaining a quality response function for changes in price. This 
function is then placed in the regulator’s problem.  
3.7.1 Implementable Decisions with Price Regulation 
The price (p) set by the regulator is an implementable decision if there exists a 
transfer (T) such that the allocation [p(q ), T(q )] satisfies the incentive compatibility 
constraint, 
 p*(p(q ),T(q ), q ) ¥ p*(p(q *),T(q *),q ) for all (q,q *) ∈ [q0,q1] μ [q0,q1]. 
If ( )p θ  is piecewise continuously differentiable, a necessary condition for an 
















Again, if p*(p,T,q ) = pQ(p,S) – C(Q,S,q ) + T, then * 1Tπ = .
49 Thus, this condition 
can be rewritten as  
 * 0p dp dθπ θ ≥ . (3.7.1) 
Therefore, under Assumptions 2 and 3, ( )p θ  is implementable if it satisfies dp/dq  ¥ 0 
(monotonicity).50  
3.7.2 Optimal Mechanism Design with Price Regulation 
In this case, the IR condition takes the form 
 ( ) [ ]* 0 1( ), ( ), ,p Tπ θ θ θ π θ θ θ≥ ∀ ∈  (3.7.2) 
where  represents the reservation utility of the firm. Thus, because dp*/dq  < 0, (3.7.2) 
is only binding at q1. 
The regulator’s objective function for given θ is  
     W*(p,S,T,q ) = aK(p,S,T) + (1 – a) π(p,S,T,q ) 
                    = aV(Q,S) - (1 – a) C(Q,S,q ) +(1 – 2a)(pQ + T), 
where Q ª Q(p,S) and S ª S(p,q ), which is linear in T. 
Considering statistical uncertainty, the regulator’s maximization problem is thus 
to maxp,T Eθ{W*(p,S,T,q )} subject to monotonicity and the IR condition in equation 
(3.7.2). From Assumption 3 and (3.7.2), the IR condition holds if q = q1, and is binding 
only at this point. Therefore the IR condition in (3.7.2) can be reduced to 
 ( )* 1 1 1( ), ( ),p Tπ θ θ θ π=   (3.7.3) 
                                                 
49  Note that S is defined by (3.4.5). 
50  See Theorem 7.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Also note that this assumptions implies the required 





as before. Using the fact that T = p*(p,T, q ) - pQ + C(Q,S,q ), the regulator’s objective 
function can be rewritten as 
 W*(p,S,T,q ) = aV(Q,S) -  (1-a) C(Q,S,q ) + (1 – 2a) ( p*(p,T,q ) + C(Q,S,q ) ) 
     = a{V(Q,S) - C(Q,S,q )} + (1 – 2a) p*(p,T,q ) 
By the envelope theorem and the IR condition in (3.7.3),  
 ( ) ( )
1




π θ θ θ π π θ θ θ θ= + ∫ % % % % %  
where ( )* ( , , ) ( )s q sp T Q p C C S Cθ θ θπ θ = − + −  is independent of T.51 Substituting this 
relationship in the regulator’s objective function obtains the maximization problem 
 maxp  ( ) ( )( )1 1
0
* * ˆ( ) ( ) (1 2 ) ( )V C d dF
θ θ
θθ θ
α θ θ α π π θ θ θ⎡ ⎤− + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ %
% %  
where 
 ( )( )*( ) ( ), ( ),V V p S pθ θ θ θ≡ , 
 ( )( ) ( )( )*C ( ) ( ), ( ), , ( ), ,C Q p S p S pθ θ θ θ θ θ θ≡ , and  
 ( )*ˆ( ) ( ), ( ),p Tπ θ π θ θ θ≡ . 
 Integrating by parts, the last term becomes 
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51  Again, Cs≡ Cs(Q(p,s),s,q ) represents the partial derivative with respect to its second argument and, 




Thus the objective function simplifies to 
( ) ( ) ( )1
0
* *( )ˆ ( , ) ( , ) ( , , ) (1 2 ) , , ( ),
( )




θθ α θ α π θ θ
θ
⎡ ⎤
= − + −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
∫   
  (3.7.4) 
where the constant term has been eliminated. The problem can now be written as 
( )*ˆmax ( , )p E W pθ θ  subject to monotonicity. Again, the solution can be found without 
considering the restriction and then later checking to see that it is met. For ease of 
notation, the integrand of the objective function can be rewritten as 
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θθ α θ α π θ
θ
θα θ α π θ
θ
= − + −
= + −
 
The solution to this relaxed program must satisfy 
 ( )*( ) ( , ) , ,q p s p pp C Q K S H p Tθα θ π θ− + = −  (3.7.5) 
where H(a,q ) = z(a) F(q )/f(q ) and  
 
( )* , , ( ( ) ) )
( ) ( ( ) .
p s ps ss ss p
s s p qs q p s p s p
p T Q p Q Q C S S
Q C S C C Q Q S C S
θ θ
θ θ θ
π θ = + + − +
− − + + +
  
The SOC for this problem is 
 ( )2 *2 ( , ) , , 0pp ps p ss p s pp ppW W S W S W S H p Tθα θ π θ+ + + + <  
and is met by Assumption 7 and the concavity of W(p,S,q ) in p as assumed in Section 3.4.  
3.7.3 When is the Relaxed Program Legitimate for Price Regulation? 















= − . 
Note that *ˆppW  is negative by the SOC, and 
* * *ˆ ( , ) ( , ) 0p p p pW W H Hθ θ θ θ θθα θ π α θ π= + + >  
by Assumptions 2, 6 and 7. Therefore, dp/dq ¥ 0, implying that the relaxed program is 
legitimate. 
Comparing (3.7.5) with the result obtained for the case of symmetric price 
regulation in (3.4.10) reveals that the most likely outcome will be p2 ≤ p4, where p2 and p4 
are the equilibrium prices for the symmetric and asymmetric information cases when only 
price is regulated, respectively.  
3.8 Conclusions to Chapter 3 
This chapter has developed four models that represent two issues in the regulation 
of a monopolist. First, it considers the issue of regulating only price vis-à-vis regulating 
price and quality. Then it considers these two cases when the information structure is 
such that the regulator has limited information about the real costs of the monopolist, i.e., 
the case when there is asymmetric information between the regulator and monopolist. A 
third element included in the analysis is a simple representation of the preferences of the 
regulator. With symmetric information, the relative preference of the regulator for 
consumers versus the monopolist does not have an impact on the efficiency of the 
outcome. This preference or “bias” only affects the allocation of surplus between 
consumers and the monopolist. If the regulator sets both price and quality, then 
achievement of the first best is possible depending on the informational structure and 




instead by the monopolist, the outcome is inefficient. Moreover, under certain conditions, 
the price and quality will be lower if only price is regulated. 
A somewhat surprising result is that the information gap does not have an impact 
on efficiency as long as both instruments of regulation, price and quality, can be used by 
the regulator, and the regulator does not favor consumers over the monopolist. When the 
regulator favors consumers, then several results are plausible, including the possibility 
that prices will be higher and quality lower under asymmetric information. Most of the 
other possible outcomes result in lower surplus for consumers.  
This result also applies to the case of price-only regulation, where a distortion 
away from the outcome under symmetric information occurs when the regulator favors 
consumers. If the regulator favors consumers, then a further wedge, in addition to the one 
due to using only one instrument, is placed between price and marginal cost, reducing 
efficiency further. The most likely situation is that price will be higher than with price-
only regulation under symmetric information. 
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4 SIMULATION OF THE REGULATION MODELS 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, I developed a general model of regulation in the presence of 
asymmetric information and considered cases when either price and quality or only price 
are regulated. The development of these models led to a set of conditions that do not 
yield unambiguous qualitative implications unless some assumptions are made. Most 
such assumptions require a reduction in the generality of the problem. Some authors who 
have examined similar models have assumed simple functional forms to obtain an 
analytic solution (see Laffont and Tirole, 1986; and Lewis and Sappington, 1988). Such 
an approach has the advantage of rendering a solution that is general with respect to the 
remaining parameters of the model. However, the use of simple functional forms may 
assume away critical aspects of the problem because generality is lost for some 
fundamental functions. 
A different approach is to postulate a more complex functional form, assume 
numeric values for the parameters, and solve the model using numerical methods. This 
approach allows modeling more realistic behavior and exploring the consequences of 
different curvatures in the basic functions. This type of analysis, however, may yield 
results that do not apply to all possible parameter values. This problem can be partially 
overcome by a sensitivity analysis that considers alternative values of the main 
parameters and evaluates the impact of various parameter values on model results. 
This chapter follows the latter approach. Prior to presenting the solution to 
specific models, I give some basic description of the functional forms that are chosen and 
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their properties. Then I present a brief description of the methods used to solve the 
systems of equations. Finally, I present a discussion of the main findings. 
4.2 Simulation Method 
I first present the functional forms I have chosen and discuss their main 
characteristics. I also make explicit the restrictions imposed on parameters so functions 
have adequate economic properties. Then I present the theoretical models developed in 
the previous chapter after incorporating proposed functional forms. Later in the chapter, 
parameter values are chosen for the simulation and a discussion is provided regarding 
how they were chosen. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the solution to the models may be, in part, 
driven by the sign of the cross derivative of the demand function. This suggests selection 
of forms that allow a positive, zero, and negative cross derivative. The demand function I 
have chosen,  
 1 23 40( , )
p sQ p s e p
β ββ ββ − −= , (4.2.1)  
with b0, b1, b2, b3 and b4 all positive, is derived from an exponential form, and is second 
order flexible in p. This function defines only the relation between quantity (Q), price (p), 
and quality (s). This demand function was selected because the signs of its derivatives 
depend only on relationships of the parameters and not on values of variables. Thus, they 
can be meaningfully altered for sensitivity analysis without causing nonsensical results.52 
                                                 
52 For this reason, no attempt was made to match this functional form of demand to the demand function 
estimated in Chapter 5. Since no data were available to estimate the cost function, the results of this 
simulation, which is based on a full model of demand and cost, cannot be made to fit a complete 
empirically-based model anyway. 
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For this reason, the main objective of the simulations in this chapter is to derive 
qualitative conclusions rather than quantitative results. 
Although demand clearly depends on other factors, these are added later for the 
econometric estimation. Because the purpose of this simulation is to solve the model and 
observe the effects of key parameter values that determine the relationship of these three 
variables, other variables are not incorporated, although they could be potentially added 
to derive, for example, policy implications.  
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Properties (4.2.2)-(4.2.4) are met because all parameters are positive. To meet (4.2.5) 
requires that 1 22 2 3(1 )p s
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A sufficient condition for Qps < 0 is b1 < b4 and a necessary and sufficient condition is 
2 1
1 4 3 1( ) s p
β ββ β β β− < . On the other hand, a necessary condition for Qps > 0 is b1 > b4 
and a necessary and sufficient condition is 2 11 4 3 1( ) s p
β ββ β β β− > . The sign of Qpp(p,s) is 
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flexible. A sufficient condition for Qpp(p,s) > 0 is 1 41 2β β≤ +  or, more generally, 
Qpp(p,s) > (<) 0 as 
  1 2 1 22 22 21 4 4 3 1 4 1 3(1 ) ( ) ( 1 2 )p s p s
β β β ββ β β β β β β β+ + > < − − . 
The cost function is postulated to follow a form related to the constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) form. This form is very flexible with respect to the curvature and 
the effect of quality on marginal cost, thus allowing alternative levels of substitution 
between the two and at the same time enabling an intuitive characterization of the results. 
The modified CES cost function is  
 [ ]( ) 43 520 1 6( , , ) (1 )( )C q s n a q s n
αα ααθ α α λ λ θ α= + + − − + ,  
where q  is the firm’s type or efficiency parameter, a is the minimum value that q can 
take, l represents the proportion of variable cost that is influenced by firm type, and n is 
the number of clients served by the firm, which is assumed to be exogenous. All ai 
parameters are assumed to be positive. With this specification, conditions (3.2.6)-(3.2.9) 
of Chapter 3 require 
 [ ] ( ) 43 52 2 111 2 4 6( , , ) (1 )( ) 0qC q s a q q s n
αα αα αθ α α α λ λ θ α
−−= + − − + >  (4.2.7)  
 [ ] ( ) 43 3 52 111 3 4 6 6( , , ) (1 )( ) 0sC q s a s q s n
αα α ααθ α α α α λ λ θ α
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× + >
 (4.2.10) 
Because a ≤ q, 0 ≤ l  ≤1, and all parameters are positive, properties (4.2.7) and (4.2.8) are 
met without further restrictions. Sufficient conditions are a2 > 1 and a2a4 > 1 for property 
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(4.2.9) and a3 > 1 and a3a4 > 1 for property (4.2.10). Necessary conditions to meet these 
properties are 322 4 2 6( 1) ( 1) 0q s
ααα α α α− + − >  and 323 3 4 6( 1) ( 1) 0q s
ααα α α α− + − > , 
respectively. Thus, alternative conditions to meet these latter properties are that, if a2 and 
a3 are less than one, then a2a4 > 1 and a3a4 > 1, or if a2a4 < 1 and a3a4 < 1 then a2 and 
a3 must be greater than one.  
The cross derivative Cqs is 
 
[ ]
( ) 43 3 52 2
1 2 3 4 6 4
21 1
6
( , , ) ( 1) (1 )( )
                            0
qsC q s a
s q q s n
αα α αα α
θ α α α α α α λ λ θ
α
−− −
= − + − −
× + >
. (4.2.11) 
With all parameters positive, Cqs is negative (positive) if a4 < 1 (a4 > 1) and zero 
otherwise. I have assumed Cqs > 0 in condition (3.2.10) of Chapter 3, because marginal 
cost very likely increases with the quality of service provided in the electricity industry. 
Thus I impose this condition in the simulations. 
4.2.1 Equations Used in the Simulation  
Applying the functional forms defined above to the theoretical model of Chapter 
3, equilibrium conditions can be obtained to characterize operation of the market in each 
scenario. The functional form chosen for the demand function, equation (4.2.1), yields 
the following total willingness-to-pay (WTP) function, 
 1 2 1 23 3( ) ( )10( , ) .
p s p s
p
V p s p e dp e
β β β ββ ββ
∞
− −−⎛ ⎞= +∫⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
%% %  
Thus, the FOC of the regulator’s problem in Section 3.3 with price and quality regulation 
under symmetric information are 
 0,qp C− =  
  (4.2.12) 
 0.s s sV pQ C− − =  
 65
The FOC of the regulator’s problem in Section 3.6, equations (3.6.9) and (3.6.10), 
with price and quality regulation under asymmetric information can be rewritten as 
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where ( )f θ  and ( )F θ  are the probability density function (p.d.f.) and cumulative 
distribution function of firms type (q ) distribution, respectively. Suppose these functions 
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d is an adjustment parameter that avoids a value of zero for the p.d.f. when θ = a. This 
distribution is a modified Beta distribution with shape parameters v and w (see Evans, 
Hastings and Peacock, 2000). This distribution was selected because it is very flexible 
and able to represent a wide range of forms for the p.d.f. that could be used to test the 
influence of p.d.f. shape in the results (Nadarajah and Gupta, 2004). This form also 
satisfies Assumption 6 in Chapter 3. Further, it is convenient for numerical simulation 
because it can be compiled within the software used for simulation, thus avoiding 
approximation errors. 
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The problems of price-only regulation are solved by adding the firms’ first-order 
conditions as a constraint to the maximization problem of the regulator.53 This problem 
was solved numerically using a system of three equations comprised of the first-order 
condition for the firms profit maximization problem with respect to quality and the 
regulator’s first-order conditions with respect to price and quality. Thus, corresponding to 



















where W* = αK + (1 – α)p  is the weighted average between consumer and producer 
surplus and g is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constrained maximization problem. 
The first-order conditions of the regulator’s problem presented in Section 3.7 with 
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= − + −  (4.2.16) 
and g* is the Lagrangian multiplier of the constrained maximization problem. 
                                                 
53  See section 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
 67
4.2.2 Parameters Chosen for Simulation 
The parameters values were chosen according to three main criteria. First, some 
of the parameters are chosen so that the variables have values that are close in magnitude 
to averages of the actual Chilean industry data to facilitate interpretation. The parameters 
that modify qualitative properties of the functions and those that define the different 
scenarios of interest where chosen so that these alternative conditions highlighted by 
Chapter 3 are generated. Other parameters are chosen through a calibration algorithm so 
that the functions have the economic properties assumed above [(4.2.2)-(4.2.5) for 
demand and (4.2.7)-(4.2.10) for cost], and so that the maximization problems have (real 
number) solutions. 
To find parameter values that conform to the requirements described above, I 
used the following procedure. First, I choose values for the parameters for which I was 
interested in testing effects. Then I selected scaling parameters that are calibrated to the 
mean values of the data. Then I gave some initial values to the rest. To obtain values for 
the scaling parameters, I used the first-order conditions of the theoretical models. Then I 
verified that all models could be solved and gave reasonable solutions. Finally, I iterated 
with different starting values and solved for scaling parameters using the different 
theoretical models until the set of parameter values met the assumed economic properties 
and all the models could be solved. This procedure allowed solutions to exist and the 
results to yield reasonable values of the variables. In the rest of this section, a detailed 
description of the parameter choices is presented. 
Table 4.1 presents the parameter values used in the total cost and total WTP 
functions. 
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Table 4.1. Parameter Values Used 
a0 8,294 b0 9,484
a1 7225 10−×  b1 0.90
a2 2.00 b2 2.00
a3 2.34 b3 2.00
a5 2.00 b4 1.00
a6 0.90 λ 0.70
 
These parameters yield cost and WTP functions with the desired properties (as 
explained above). Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 depict cost and WTP as functions of price for 
a given quality and of quality for a given price, respectively. The shapes and qualitative 
differences of these functions are similar for levels of given quality (or price). In these 
figures, cost and WTP are presented on a per client basis, and the magnitudes represent 
thousand of pesos (Chilean currency). Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the two functions are 
decreasing in price and that the difference in the two is maximized for prices above 30 
(pesos per Kw/hr), whereas industry average values (in Chile) are close to 60 and prices 
below 20 are very unlikely. Figure 4.2, on the other hand, presents the relationships 
between cost, WTP, and quality, with price held constant. Both, cost and WTP are 
increasing in quality but at decreasing and increasing rates, respectively. Quality is 
measured by an index where initial values used for calibrating the model are close to 100.  
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Figure 4.1. Cost and WTP as Functions of Price 
 
Figure 4.2. Cost and WTP as Functions of Quality 
 
Alternative parameter values were used to assess the effect of a different sign of the cross 
derivative of the demand function on the results. Specifically, the value of b1 was set 
alternatively to values greater and less than one. This yields alternative sets of parameter 
values that have different signs of cross derivatives.  
The parameters of the p.d.f. in (4.2.13) are assumed to take the following values: 
v = 2, w =  2, a = 0.5, and d = 1. These parameter values are chosen so that the range of 
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types is bounded away from zero, and to avoid having (4.2.16) undefined at the lower 
support of the distribution (because the p.d.f. could otherwise take a value of zero).  
The p.d.f. of the modified Beta distribution in (4.2.13) evaluated at these 
parameter values is depicted in Figure 4.3. Even though the shape presented here could 
have been achieved with a simpler form, a better performance in numeric calculations 
together with a flexibility to represent alternative shapes by a small change in parameters 
motivates the use of this form.  
Figure 4.3. The Modified Beta p.d.f. with a = 0.5 
 
 
This distribution of types plus the value selected for λ yields a difference in cost 
between the most efficient and most inefficient firm types of about 20% of the former. 
No data are available giving direct evidence on variation in firm efficiencies. However, 
Lomuscio (2004) presents variations of up to 8% for prices set to different companies in 
similar areas in Chile using data for the year 2000. This could be an indication of the 
distribution of firm types in the industry as evidenced by differences in costs. 









4.2.3 Scenarios Considered 
To investigate the effect that different curvatures in the demand function have on 
the model’s outcome, I solved the model numerically using several possible scenarios. 
The marginal effect of price on demand (Qp) can be decreasing or increasing in quality. If 
the effect is decreasing (increasing), then quality acts as a complement (substitute).  
I consider two different scenarios with opposite signs of the cross derivative of 
the demand function characterizing different consumer preferences. In addition, other 
scenarios are generated by considering characteristics of the regulator framework such as 
the number of instruments used for regulation (scope of regulation), the information 
structure, and the regulator’s “bias” or preference. The number of instruments refers to 
whether only price is regulated or both price and quality are regulated. The information 
structure refers to whether information is symmetric or asymmetric between the regulator 
and the firm. Specifically, asymmetry exists when the regulator cannot perfectly observe 
the firm’s costs.  
The regulator’s preference refers to the weights on consumer versus producer 
surplus in the regulator’s objective function. To keep the model as simple as possible, I 
have assumed this function to be a linear weighted-average of producer and consumer 
surpluses. The important cases for a (the preference parameter) are a = 0.5, 0.5 < a ≤ 1.0, 
and 0.0 ≤ a < 0.5. Thus, three scenarios are considered with a = 0.75 for a regulator that 
favors consumer, a = 0.5 for a neutral regulator, and a = 0.45 for a regulator that favors 
the producer.54 I also consider alternative parameters for the modified Beta distribution 
where v = 1 and w = 1 represents a uniform distribution of firms’ types.  
                                                 
54`Although a value of α = 0.25 was initially considered, the calibration of model parameters proved very 
difficult for this set of values of alpha. 
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Considering the information structure and scope of regulation, four main 
scenarios arise: 
• Price-only regulation with symmetric information 
• Price and quality regulation with symmetric information 
• Price-only regulation with asymmetric information 
• Price and quality regulation with asymmetric information 
Considering all variants in models and scenarios yields a total of 32 alternative 
configurations. The models were solved numerically for each of the scenarios, although I 
only report those for which the most interesting results where found. 
4.2.4 Numerical Solution 
In this section, I present a discussion of the approach to numerical solution of the 
model. Once the functional forms and parameters were specified, Mathematica® was 
used to solve the analytical models numerically. First, the basic functions (demand and 
cost) were defined and then derived functions (consumer and producer surplus) based on 
the chosen functional forms were obtained. Using the built-in analytical derivative 
function, the first-order conditions were obtained for each of the models. Then the 
numerical values selected for each coefficient were assigned and the system of equations 
was solved to find the optimal price and quality for each value of q, i.e., for each firm 
type. Although, the theoretical models assume that type is a continuous variable, by 
taking an arbitrarily large number of values of q in the interval 0.5 to 1.5, the solution was 
approximated with a discrete firm type distribution. In other words using numerical 
methods, a finite but arbitrarily large number of point solutions that belong to the 
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continuous problem were examined. Then the functions were evaluated at each of these 
points. 
Because first-order conditions are solved numerically as a system of equations, 
finding a maximum is only guaranteed under the specific conditions discussed above. 
Therefore, the second-order conditions were derived analytically and tested numerically 
to make sure they were met at each solution point. 
The computation of the transfer payment plays a key role in the numerical 
solution of the models. Its computation differs depending on the informational structure 
and the number of instruments that are regulated. In what follows, I discuss how the 
transfer was computed in each of the four main scenarios depending on which of the two 
information structures applies and whether only price or both price and quality are 
regulated. 
Following equation (3.3.6), when price and quality are regulated and the regulator 
is biased toward consumers in a symmetric information environment, I replace the 
transfer variable in the objective functions with 
 ( , , ) ( ( , ), , ) / ( , )T p s C Q p s s n p Q p sθ θ= − ⋅ . (4.2.17) 
This transfer expression differs slightly from equation (3.3.6) because the firm’s 
reservation value is assumed to be zero and the cost function is divided by the number of 
clients. With a zero reservation value, the transfer is never negative in equilibrium for the 
parameter values used here. The division by the number of clients (n > 0) is necessary 
because the cost function represents the total cost of the utility, which depends on the 
number of clients and their individual demands for electricity, Q(p,s). This expression 
replaces T in the regulator’s objective function, which therefore becomes a function of 
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only price and quality for the given parameters.55 After equilibrium values of p and s are 
found using (4.2.12), they are replaced in equation (4.2.17) to obtain the equilibrium 
transfer.  
The computation of the transfer when only price is regulated in a symmetric 
information environment also uses expression (4.2.17), but with the exception that 
equilibrium price and quality are estimated using (4.2.14). If a ≤ 0.5, then the transfer is 
computed following equation (3.3.7), assuming a zero reservation value for consumers. 
In the models of asymmetric information, the IC and IR constraints [equations 
(3.6.1) and (3.6.4), respectively] are imposed through transformation of the objective 
function and the way the transfer is computed. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), 
the transfer is calculated as:  
T*(qa, qt) = C[Q*(qa),s*(qa),qt]/n – p*(qa) Q*[p*(qa),s*(qa)]  
 + {C[Q*(q1),s*(q1),q1] – C[Q*(q1),s*(q1),qt]}/n (4.2.18) 
where Q*(q) ª Q*[p*(q),s*(q)], p*(q) and s*(q) represent the equilibrium quantity, price and 
quality for firm type q, respectively, and q1 is the least efficient type. When the IC 
constraint is met, the announced type (qa) will be the true type of the firm (qt). Thus the 
IC constraint requires that the solution of the problem  
Maxqa  p [p*(qa), s*(qa), T*(qa, qt); qt] 
satisfies qa = qt. To illustrate, Figure 4.4 shows the (per client) producer surplus, p, 
obtained by a firm whose true type is qt = 1.2 for all possible announced types, qa, with 
transfer T* and producer surplus net of the transfer, p – T*. This figure demonstrates that 
the transfer is such that, for any (true) firm type, producer surplus is maximized where 
                                                 
55  Note that the number of clients (n) is assumed exogenous and therefore behaves as a parameter with 
individual values for each firm. 
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the announced type is is the true type. Thus, there is no incentive to misrepresent the true 
type. Figure 4.4 also shows that the transfer can be decomposed in two amounts. The first 
reflects the IR constraint and is thus the amount that would make the producer surplus 
equal to zero for the true type, approximately $6.264. The second is the cost of having an 
IC compliant transfer, approximately $734.  
Figure 4.4. Per Client Transfer and Producer Surplus for All Possible  
        Announced Types of a Firm Whose True Type is 1.2  
 
 
When only one instrument can be regulated under asymmetric information, the 
equilibrium price and quality are computed using (4.2.15) following a procedure similar 
to that described for one-instrument regulation under symmetric information except that 
in this case (4.2.18) must be used.  
When a < 0.5, then under asymmetric information the transfer is calculated as  
 T*(qa,qt) = V[p*(qa),s*(qa)] – p*(qa) Q*[p*(qa),s*(qa)]  




The main findings of the numerical simulations are presented in this section. They 
display the behavior of the most relevant indicators such as welfare measures and values 
of the regulated variables. Additionally, the effects of changing other parameters on these 
results are presented. 
4.3.1 Effects on Welfare 
Total welfare, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus or as the 
difference between total WTP and total cost, is larger when price and quality are 
regulated vis-à-vis when only price is regulated (see Figure 4.5). Also, in the symmetric 
information models, aggregate welfare is at least as great as in asymmetric models when 
considering the same number of instruments, except if the regulator is unbiased, in which 
case it is equal for all firm types. 





Not surprisingly, the gap between the two becomes increasingly larger for less 
efficient firms (higher q ) for both price-and-quality and price-only regulation, but on 
average is larger under price-and-quality regulation (see Figure 4.6). This gap can be 
understood as the welfare loss due to hidden information. It is also larger when the 
regulator favors consumers (Figure 4.6) over the case when it favors producers (Figure 
4.7). 
Figure 4.6. Differences in Welfare, Symmetric Minus Asymmetric Information  
      Models: The Case Where the Regulator Favors Consumers 
 
 
For the most efficient regulated firm, welfare is the same under both information 
structures, a result known in the literature as no-distortion at the top.56 Therefore, as 
                                                 
56  As expected, this result does not hold when a uniform distribution is assumed. 
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expected, the highest welfare levels are achieved with an unbiased regulator under 
symmetric information when both price and quality are regulated. The loss in welfare in 
the presence of asymmetric information is due to the existence of a preference or bias by 
the regulator. 
Also the effect of asymmetric information on welfare is smaller than the effect of 
having an additional instrument to use for regulation, i.e., the ability to regulate both 
price and quality rather than only price (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6) 
Figure 4.7. Differences in Welfare, Symmetric Minus Asymmetric Information  
        Models: The Case Where the Regulator Favors the Producer 
 
 
The effect of the demand function’s curvature is such that, when Qps is greater 
than zero (as in Figure 4.5), welfare is lower independent of the information structure or 
the number of instruments that are used. Additionally, the gap in welfare between price-
and-quality regulation and price-only regulation is larger when Qps is less than zero. 
Moreover, these two results hold for all regulator’s preferences and both distributions of 
firm type (not shown). 
θ
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Table 4.2 presents a summary of the relative values of expected welfare resulting 
from the main scenarios considered.57 With symmetric information, the effect of 
regulator preference is irrelevant in terms of welfare. With a neutral regulator, 
information asymmetry has no impact on welfare. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical findings of Chapter 3. When Qps > 0, the impact of information asymmetry is 
proportionally higher than when Qps has the opposite sign. When Qps < 0, the impact of 
the scope of regulation is also proportionally higher. That is, under this condition 
regulating price and quality vis-à-vis regulating price only has larger effect on welfare. 
Table 4.2. Qualitative Comparison of Expected Welfare for the Different Scenarios 
Preference of the Regulator Consumers Neutral Producer 
 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 
Price and Quality Regulation,  
Symmetric Information A D A D A D 
Price and Quality Regulation,  
Asymmetric Information C F A D B E 
Price Only Regulation,  
Symmetric Information G J G J G J 
Price Only Regulation,  
Asymmetric Information I L G J H K 
 
4.3.2 Producer and Consumer Surplus 
With a consumer-biased regulator, producer surplus is zero for all firm types in 
the symmetric information scenarios because zero reservation values are imposed. As 
expected, the regulator can extract the entire surplus from producers, whether regulating 
price and quality or only price. With asymmetric information, producers are left with 
information rents that decrease with type. Figure 4.8 presents the estimated producer 
surplus for each model with asymmetric information. This surplus represents the 
information rents earned by the producer. Also, as is the case with welfare, producer 
                                                 
57  The summary is presented in terms of expectations with respect to the unknown firm type with A 
representing the highest and L the lowest. 
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surplus is higher for all types except the least efficient type when both price and quality 
are regulated compared to the case where only price is regulated. This result implies that, 
in a regulatory environment with asymmetric information, producers should prefer 
regulation of both price and quality because it increases their information rents. This is 
consistent with findings by Lewis and Sappington (1988), where quality is observable. 
Figure 4.8. Producer Surplus with Asymmetric Information  
            and a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers 
 
 
When the regulator is biased toward producers, producer surplus will no longer be 
zero with symmetric information, and will be higher when regulating price and quality 
vis-à-vis regulating only price. But the difference in producer surplus between the 
symmetric and asymmetric models is on average higher for price-only regulation as 
shown in Figure 4.9. In this case, the regulator tries to favor producers but must still meet 
the IR constraint. Thus, the surplus is higher the more control the regulator has, e.g. when 
only price is controlled there is hidden information and thus information losses to the 
producer. 









Price and Quality Regulation
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Figure 4.9. Differences in Producer Surplus with a Regulator Biased Toward  
  Producers: Symmetric Minus Asymmetric Information 
 
 
With a regulator biased toward consumers, consumer surplus is higher when 
regulating price and quality as opposed to regulating only price as shown in Figure 4.10. 
This figure also shows that the gap in consumer surplus between scenarios of symmetric 
and asymmetric information is larger with price and quality regulation, and that this gap 
decreases with type. These results hold across changes in the curvature of the WTP 
function as well as for the two different distributions of firm types. With no regulatory 
bias, consumer surplus with the most inefficient firm is equal for the symmetric and 
asymmetric scenarios.58 With a regulator biased toward producers, consumer surplus will 
be zero for all scenarios and firm types, except when regulating only price with 
asymmetric information. In this case, consumer surplus is also decreasing in type but 
equal to zero for the most inefficient firm, as shown in Figure 4.11. This result arises 
                                                 
58  In this case, the surplus is arbitrarily allocated to consumers. 
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because the regulator has to identify the type of the firm before assigning a transfer that is 
incentive compatible and favors producers. 
Figure 4.10. Consumer Surplus With a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers 
 
 







Price and Quality Regulation with Symmetric Information
Price-Only Regulation with Symmetric Information
Price and Quality Regulation with Asymmetric Information
Price-Only Regulation with Asymmetric Information
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Figure 4.11. Consumer Surplus With a Regulator Biased Toward Producers:  




Price is higher when regulating only price compared to the models when both 
price and quality are regulated, as shown in Figure 4.12. With a regulator biased toward 
consumers, price is higher in the scenarios with asymmetric information vis-à-vis 
symmetric information, regardless of the scope of regulation (price and quality versus 
only price) or curvature of the WTP function. This difference is zero for the most 
efficient firm type and increases with firm type (decreases with firm efficiency). With a 
regulator biased toward producers, the same results apply except that symmetric 
information models yield higher prices than asymmetric models. 
θ
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4.3.4 Quality  
The highest levels of equilibrium quality are found for two-instrument regulation 
scenarios (see Figure 4.13). Quality is always lower with a less efficient firm. When 
regulating price and quality with a regulator biased toward consumers, the asymmetric 
information model yields lower quality, except for the most efficient type, and the gap 
between the two is higher for less efficient firms. When regulating only price, this 
difference in quality is significantly smaller and the scenario with asymmetric 
information yields higher quality than the scenario with symmetric information (see 
Figure 4.14). If the regulator is biased toward producers then the opposite is true.  









Price and Quality Regulation with Symmetric Information
Price-Only Regulation with Symmetric Information
Price and Quality Regulation with Asymmetric Information
Price-Only Regulation with Asymmetric Information
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With a regulator that favors the producer, the model with asymmetric information 
yields higher quality than the one with symmetric information when regulating price and 
quality. In contrast, the model with symmetric information yields higher quality than the 
one with asymmetric information when regulating only price (see Table 4.3). This result 
is reversed with a regulator that favors consumers. That is, the model with asymmetric 
information yields lower quality than the one with symmetric information when 
regulating price and quality. But the model with symmetric information yields lower 
quality than the one with asymmetric information when regulating only price. This result 
is explained by the fact that the regulator tries to attain the highest welfare for the party of 
interest (consumers or the producer) but information asymmetries prevent her from 
reaching that level, thus achieving a lower (higher) quality when she prefers consumers 
(the producer) and can set price and quality. 
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Figure 4.14. Equilibrium Quality with a Regulator Biased Toward  
                Consumers: The Case With Price-Only Regulation 
 
 
Because the values obtained for the quality variable do not have a direct 
interpretation, I present a summary table where the expected quality level is replaced by a 
categorical representation where “A” represents the highest quality and “L” represents 
the lowest quality (Table 4.3).59 This table shows that, with a neutral regulator, 
information has no effect on quality and that, with symmetric information, the regulator’s 
preference has no impact on quality. Interestingly, when regulating price and quality 
under asymmetric information, expected quality is lower with a regulator that favors 
consumers than with a neutral regulator, and higher than either of these with a regulator 
                                                 
59  See footnote 57. 







Price-Only Regulation with Symmetric Information
Price-Only Regulation with Asymmetric Information
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that favors the producer. The opposite is true when regulating only price with asymmetric 
information. 
Table 4.3. Qualitative Comparison of Expected Quality for the Different Scenariosa 
Preference of the Regulator Consumer Neutral Producer 
 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 Qps < 0 Qps > 0 
Price and Quality Regulation,  
Symmetric Information B E B E B E 
Price and Quality Regulation,  
Asymmetric Information C F B E A D 
Price Only Regulation,  
Symmetric Information K H K H K H 
Price Only Regulation,  
Asymmetric Information J G K H L I 
a Expected quality is represented categorically such that A is the highest and L the lowest. 
 
Equilibrium price and quality can be grouped in two classes of solutions, high-
price-low-quality (HPLQ) and low-price-high-quality (LPHQ). For all scenarios and 
models considered here, HPLQ is reached with price only regulation and LPHQ is 
reached with price and quality regulation. With a regulator biased toward consumers, the 
equilibrium price and quality coincide only for the most efficient firm. When regulating 
price and quality, the difference between symmetric and asymmetric information models 
is such that they have similar slope in the price to quality function, but the asymmetric 
information model yields solutions with higher dispersion among firm types (see Figure 
4.15). When regulating only price, this slope is no longer similar and the asymmetric 
information model yields higher prices but also higher qualities than the symmetric 
information model. The difference in price and quality between the two models is higher 
for more inefficient firms, and zero for the most efficient firm (see Figure 4.16). 
When the regulator favors producers, then also HPLQ is found with price-only 
regulation and LPHQ is found with price and quality regulation (not shown). But in this 
case, when regulating both price and quality, the symmetric information model yields 
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solutions with higher dispersion among firm types. And when regulating only price, the 
symmetric information model yields higher prices and higher qualities than the 
asymmetric information model. 
Figure 4.15. Equilibrium Price and Quality with Price and Quality  




Figure 4.16. Equilibrium Price and Quality with Price-Only  




In all models, quantity is completely determined by price and quality and, thus, 
provides no additional information about the solution. Nevertheless presenting the results 
in terms of quantity facilitates understanding of the results. Although the unit of 
measurement of quantity is not given explicitly in the figures, quantity is measured in per 
client annual kilowatts per hour. As with the price-quality relationship, there is no 
difference between the solutions with symmetric and asymmetric information. This figure 
shows that price and quality regulation yields a high-quality-high-quantity equilibrium 
compared to price-only regulation, which yields a low-quality-low-quantity solution. 
4.3.6 Transfers 
Transfers to producers are higher when both price and quality are regulated as 
opposed to regulating only price (see Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18). Also, transfers 
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decrease with firm type (increase with efficiency) except when regulating only price 
under symmetric information with a regulator that is unbiased or biased toward 
consumers (see Figure 4.18). With a regulator biased toward consumers, the models with 
asymmetric information yield higher transfers for the more efficient firms and lower 
transfers for the more inefficient firms when compared to models of symmetric 
information that use the same instruments. This implies existence of at least one firm type 
for which the information structure has no effect on the transfer. With a regulator biased 
toward producers, transfers are higher with asymmetric information when regulating both 
price and quality but lower when regulating only price (not shown). With an unbiased 
regulator, transfers are equal for the most inefficient firm when comparing asymmetric 
and symmetric information models (not shown). 
Figure 4.17. Equilibrium Transfers When Regulating Both Price and  




Figure 4.18. Equilibrium Transfers When Regulating Only Price  
         With a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers   
 
 
4.3.7 Cost  
The information structure has no impact on total costs across firm types. From 
Figure 4.19, they are the same with price and quality regulation as with price-only 
regulation. This figure also shows that cost is lower when regulating only price vis-à-vis 
regulating price and quality, and this difference is higher for more efficient firms. This is 
true for different curvatures of the WTP function. But with a regulator biased toward 
producers, this difference is lower for more efficient firms. 
θ
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Figure 4.19. Equilibrium Cost With a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers   
 
 
4.3.8 The Impact of the Regulator’s Preference  
When the regulator is not biased (a = 0.5), the welfare levels achieved under 
asymmetric and symmetric information models are the same. Price and quality levels are 
also the same. However, results differ according to the scope of regulation (price-and-
quality vis-à-vis price-only regulation). The use of two instruments yields higher levels of 
welfare, quantity and quality, and lower prices. When the regulator’s preference does not 
favor consumers, the information structure has no effect on consumer surplus for the 
most inefficient firm (see Figure 4.20). When regulating both price and quality, transfers 
in the models of asymmetric information are always higher except for the least efficient 
firm, where they are the same as those under symmetric information (not shown). But 
when regulating only price the opposite is true, reflecting the fact that the regulator has 
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fewer instruments to achieve its goal. When the regulator does not favor producers, 
transfers are higher in the asymmetric information models.  
Notably, the results differ according to the number of instruments used by the 
regulator without information asymmetries. This is also true in the absence of regulator 
“bias” under information asymmetries. Thus, the welfare levels achieved by regulating 
both price and quality are higher than those achieved by regulating only price. This 
difference owes mainly to the difference in consumer surplus because producer surplus 
remains low when the regulator favors consumers, which in turn owes to larger quantities 
and higher qualities when both price and quality are regulated. This difference represents 
inefficiency due to the fact that both affect the objective function regardless of whether 
both are regulated. 





4.3.9 The Case of a Uniform Distribution 
Setting the parameters of modified Beta distribution to v = 1 and w = 1, a uniform 
distribution of firm types is obtained. For this distribution, results differ slightly from the 
case above, but the more fundamental results remain intact. Price for the most efficient 
type is no longer the same across information structures in the various regulatory models 
(see Figure 4.21). Also the price–quality relation no longer coincides for the most 
efficient firm with price and quality regulation (compare Figure 4.22 with Figure 4.15) or 
price only regulation (compare Figure 4.23 with Figure 4.16). This is due to the fact that 
the initial effect of firm inefficiency is not smooth with a uniform type distribution. Thus 
information asymmetry and regulator bias introduce a difference in the price-quality 
ratio. 
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Figure 4.21. Equilibrium Prices With a Regulator Biased Toward  






Figure 4.22. Price and Quality With Price and Quality Regulation by a Regulator 
  Biased Toward Consumers and Uniformly Distributed Firm Types 
 
 
 Figure 4.23. Price and Quality with Price-Only Regulation by a Regulator  
  Biased Toward Consumers and Uniformly Distributed Firm Types 
 











4.3.10 Marginal Costs 
Marginal costs for the different models with a regulator biased toward consumer 
are depicted in Figure 4.24. When both price and quality are regulated, marginal costs are 
higher than when only price is regulated, regardless of the information structure. As 
expected, the difference in marginal costs between symmetric and asymmetric 
information models increases with firm type, although this is less evident under a uniform 
distribution (not shown). This difference is positive with a regulator biased toward 
consumers, negative with a regulator biased toward producers, and zero with an unbiased 
regulator (not shown). 
However, when marginal costs are compared to prices under symmetric 
information, they are equal when price and quality are regulated whereas equilibrium 
prices are higher than marginal costs when only price is regulated (see Figure 4.25). The 
latter remains true with an unbiased regulator, in which case this is also true for the 
asymmetric information models. With a regulator biased toward consumers, price is 
higher than marginal cost for the asymmetric information models except for the most 
efficient firm type when both price and quality are regulated, in which case they are equal 
(see Figure 4.26). When the regulator is biased toward producers, price is lower than 
marginal cost when regulating price and quality except for the most efficient firm type, 
for which they are equal (not shown). In this case, price is also higher than marginal cost 
when regulating only price. Independent of the regulator’s bias, equilibrium price when 
regulating only price is higher that the equilibrium price when regulating both price and 
quality, and marginal cost is lower when regulating only price as compared to models 
where both price and quality are regulated (see Figure 4.26). 
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Figure 4.24. Equilibrium Marginal Costs With a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers 
 
 
Figure 4.25. Marginal Cost and Price With Symmetric Information  






Figure 4.26. Marginal Cost and Price With Asymmetric Information  
and a Regulator Biased Toward Consumers 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions to Chapter 4 
 From the analysis in this chapter, clear patterns are observed with respect to the 
effect of the information structure and the number of instruments used for regulation on 
the distribution of price, quality and transfers across firm types, and on overall welfare 
and its allocation. The results also demonstrate the impact of different consumer and 
regulator preferences, and different firm efficiency distributions.  
The use of two instruments instead of one yields higher welfare levels 
independent of the information structure and independent of the regulator’s preference. 
That is, when regulating both, price and quality, higher levels of welfare are achieved 
than when only price is regulated. Asymmetric information has no effect on welfare 
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unless the regulator has biased preferences, which causes a reduction in welfare (vis-à-vis 
the symmetric information case) that is higher for less efficient firms but nil for the most 
efficient firm. These results hold for both curvatures of the WTP function that were 
examined.60 
A regulator biased toward consumers cannot extract all producer surplus when 
information is asymmetric. Thus, consumers pay information rents. More importantly, 
regulation of both price and quality is weakly preferred by the regulator and by regulated 
firms independent of the information structure. Therefore, if a quality index can be 
developed, one should expect to see it implemented because both parties prefer it.61 
These results hold for all consumer preferences and distributions of firm types examined 
here. Thus, if complete regulation is defined as the use of all instruments available, then 
incomplete regulation should be observed only when at least one of the available 
instruments is not verifiable. 
The highest provision of quality is obtained when both quantity and quality are 
regulated jointly regardless of the information structure. As expected, lower quality is 
provided by less efficient firms. This is true for both curvatures of the WTP function that 
were examined. The effects of information asymmetries depend on the regulator’s 
preferences. When the regulator has no bias, quality remains equal between symmetric 
and asymmetric models. But when the regulator’s preference is biased toward consumers 
(producers), symmetric information models yield higher (lower) quality except for the 
most efficient firm, which yields the same quality.  
                                                 
60 Also the simulations where run using values of λ in the range 0.05 to 0.95 and no qualitative changes 
where observed. 
61  This assumes quality is perfectly verifiable. 
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The results obtained here are consistent with other studies that have examined 
similar problems (see Baron and Myerson, 1982). That is, with a regulator biased toward 
consumers or unbiased, prices are a non-decreasing function of firm type, quantities are a 
non-increasing function of firm type and, in the presence of asymmetric information, 
prices (quantities) are higher (lower) than under symmetric information due to an extra 
incentive necessary to reveal the firm’s type. When considering a regulator biased toward 
producers, prices are lower than marginal costs (except for the most efficient firm) when 
regulating with both instruments under asymmetric information. This result can hold in 
this study because of the non-linear pricing made possible through transfer payments. 
Transfers are higher when regulating price and quality, which reflects the greater 
ability of the regulator to transfer surplus from producer to consumers. In the absence of 
regulator bias, transfers under asymmetric information are higher for all firm types. But 
when the regulator is biased toward consumers, this is not the case. Rather, efficient 
(inefficient) firms will receive a higher (lower) transfer than they receive under 
symmetric information. With a regulator biased toward producers, transfers are higher 
when regulating both price and quality vis-à-vis regulating only price and, when 
regulating both price and quality, transfers are also higher with asymmetric information 
vis-à-vis symmetric information. But when regulating only price, the symmetric 
information model yields higher transfers vis-à-vis asymmetric information, except for 
the most inefficient firm, in which case they are equal. 
The highest overall welfare levels are achieved when regulating both price and 
quality under symmetric information. This amounts to a first best, where the total surplus 
is maximized, but allocated toward consumers or producers according to the regulator’s 
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preference. In this case, price and marginal cost are equal. In the cases analyzed here, the 
number of instruments (one or two) has a larger impact in this reduction than information 
asymmetry, which has no effect in the presence of an unbiased regulator. 
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5 ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY IN CHILE  
5.1 Introduction 
Some of the results from the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 were 
dependent upon the marginal effect of quality. In Chapter 4, I answered some of the 
questions left open from the theoretical analysis of Chapter 3 by numerically simulating 
plausible scenarios, including two alternative parameter specifications that yielded 
opposite signs on the marginal effect of quality on the demand price elasticity. To further 
narrow the results sought in this research, this chapter undertakes an empirical enquiry 
regarding the demand elasticity.  
To evaluate the effect of quality, no local experiment of variation is available, so 
extra-market information is required (Spence, 1975). Thus, the only way for a regulator 
to achieve the highest welfare levels is to retrieve information about the effects of quality 
through surveys or other means. 
In this chapter, I estimate a demand function for electricity in Chile that includes 
quality as a variable determining quantity demanded. Quality is taken from an index 
constructed by the regulator based on a survey conducted among clients of each electric 
utility. The model assumes that prices are set exogenously by the regulator and quality is 
also determined exogenously by the electric utility. Ideally, these assumptions could be 
relaxed by estimating a complete system including the supply side, but data limitations do 
not allow estimating the cost function parameters of firms.  
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5.2 Literature Review 
 
The estimation of joint demand systems for electricity and other energy sources, 
such as natural gas, has presented a challenge due to the regulated nature of these 
industries and the distinctive characteristics of home energy goods. Although some 
authors have estimated complete demand systems using an almost ideal demand system 
and other specifications (Berkhout, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Muskens, 2004), most studies 
estimate an independent demand equation for electricity alone, or a system with one 
equation for each electric appliance (Barnes, Gillingham and Hagemann, 1981). One of 
the characteristics of many electricity markets is the use of nonlinear pricing schemes. 
Some authors have estimated the effects of declining block rates, concluding that 
different blocks have different elasticities (Halvorsen, 1975; Herriges and King, 1994). 
The difficulty with these studies is that the precise rate schedule is not always available 
and, many times, is averaged among many consumers. 
The literature also includes substantial discussion about how or when estimates 
represent long- or short-term elasticities. Recognizing that demand for electricity is 
derived from services that electric appliances provide, many studies have proposed 
detailed models considering the electricity consumption of each appliance. These models 
assume that short-term demand is determined by the stock of appliances and its energy 
efficiency attributes. On the other hand, a long-term decision adjusts the stock of 
appliances, thus permitting full adjustment to price variations. Joint estimation of the 
demand for appliances and electricity requires testing for exogeneity of the appliance 
effect in the electricity demand equation because, otherwise, the coefficient estimates will 
be biased (Bernard, Bolduc and Belanger, 1996; Dubin and McFadden, 1984). The 
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studies that model the demand for appliances explicitly are not very common because this 
type of data is not widely available. This is especially true in the context of developing 
countries. 
Since the seminal work of Balestra and Nerlove (1966), the convenience of 
working with panel data has been established. Kaserman and Mayo (1985) estimate the 
effect of conservational advertisement on demand using a firm-level panel, and Berkhout, 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, and Muskens (2004) consider the effect of an energy tax using a 
household-level panel. Also, when only long series are available, some authors have used 
cointegration analysis to estimate price and income elasticities (see Engle, Granger and 
Hallman, 1989; and Erdogdu, 2007). 
The estimation of demand and especially demand for energy is not very common 
in developing countries, mainly because of the lack of data. Early studies were very 
aggregated and closer to macroeconomic models or engineering models. These models 
were advanced significantly by the work of Westley (1984; 1992). In Chile, one recent 
study has made a serious effort to estimate the demand for electricity (Benavente, et al., 
2005). This study addressed the challenge of estimating a panel of small size and duration 
by using a Monte Carlo simulation to select their estimator.  
This chapter presents new estimates of demand for electricity in Chile using an 
aggregated model based on data from several distribution companies for 3 years. The 
estimation explicitly considers the quality of service perceived by consumers. 
Econometric estimations that consider quality of service are not very common, most 
studies only focus on estimating outage costs or reliability problems, which is only one of 
the many dimensions of the quality of service concept considered here (Bernstein and 
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Agurto, 1992; Klytchnikova, 2006; Serra and Fierro, 1997; Serra, 1997; Westley, 1984). 
Another line of research has been to apply a stated-preference experiment to consumers 
asking them to choose between specific quality attributes and different price levels (see 
Söderberg, 2007; Yongxin, Deilami and Train, 1998). 
5.3 The Econometric Model 
The demand function considered in equation (4.2.1) in Chapter 4 is a function of 
price and quality. To capture at least a second-order approximation of the effect of 
quality on demand, I estimate a translog specification, which includes an interaction term 
between these two variables. This function has the advantage of linearity in parameters, 
which facilitates greater flexibility and diagnostic analysis in the estimation even though 
it does not impose qualitative relationships globally as does the function used in Chapter 
4. In particular, a term that reflects the impact of quality on the marginal effect of price 
on quantity demanded is included in the estimated demand equation because the theory of 
Chapter 3 and results of Chapter 4 suggest that determining the sign of this term is critical 
in resolving remaining ambiguities. I have also included a variable reflecting the role of 
population density, urbanization, and accompanying lifestyles in different sized cities. A 
number-of-clients variable is used for this purpose because no other information on 
population density or rurality was available.  
The general form of the estimated demand function is thus of the form 
    ( ) ( )2 220 1 2 3 4 5 6 7ln ln ln ln ln lnit it it it it it it it it itQ p s p s s p cl cl eβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + + ,  
  (5.3.1)  
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where Qit is the annual per household consumption of electricity served by firm i in year 
t, sit is the associated quality, pit is the associated price (the variable part of a two part 
tariff), clit is the number of clients served by each firm i in year t as an indicator of the 
size and density of each service area, and eit represents an error term. The raw rather than 
logarithmic form of the quality variable is used because it is merely an index. For 
estimation, this demand equation is augmented in several alternative ways to capture the 
effects of variation in economic characteristics and climate using either fixed regional 
and time effects or income and temperature variables. 
5.4 The Data 
The main sources of information for the electricity industry in Chile are the 
regulatory agencies, which collect the data from firms, consumers, and operators. These 
regulatory institutions are the National Energy Commission (CNE) and Superintendence 
of Electricity and Fuels (SEC), which collect statistical information to regulate the 
industry. Part of the information is generated by these institutions but some also comes 
from the regulated firms. Also, the centralized electricity system operator or economic 
load dispatch center (CDEC) generates all of the information on electricity generation, 
transmission, and transactions. 
The data available for each distribution company are the (regulated) prices 
charged to their customers, the volume of electricity sold, and the number of clients. 
Volumes traded and prices are obtained from the CNE. Information on quality is obtained 
from the SEC, which receives the data from surveys that firms are required to conduct of 
their customers. Prices are measured in constant (December 1998) Chilean pesos per kW-
h per client for the variable part and in constant Chilean pesos per client for the fixed 
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part, which is considered below even though not included in equation (5.3.1). Electricity 
consumption is measured in megawatt-hours (MW-h) per client per year.62  
Quality is measured by a survey that each electric utility has to conduct by law. 
Consumers are asked to evaluate the quality of the service based on technical parameters 
(such as variations in power, blackouts duration, etc.) and technical and commercial 
customer service (e.g., bill payment assistance). Data on quality of service is not usually 
available for developing countries. Thus, this data presents an important opportunity to 
evaluate the role of a broad measure of quality in demand and the related regulatory 
process. The final index value is a weighted average of these three sections of the 
survey.63 Unfortunately, the only information available from the survey is the final index, 
which thus prevents evaluating the role of each separate measure of quality that 
contributes to the index. 
Chile is divided into 13 regions that reflect regional variation in climate and 
economic circumstances, (see Figure 5.1).64 Because Chile is a narrow country, regions 
are ordered form north to south with Region 1 in the extreme north and Region 12 in the 
extreme south. Region 13 is the Metropolitan Region (RM) where Santiago, the capital, is 
located in the middle of the country. Regional variation in climate and economic 
circumstances can be represented in the model in (5.3.1) either by introducing specific 
climate and economic variables or by introducing fixed effects of time and regions. To 
represent local economic circumstances, I use Regional GDP which is estimated by the 
Central Bank of Chile and measured in constant (1996) thousand pesos per capita. To 
                                                 
62  One megawatt-hour is the amount of (usually electrical) energy expended by a one megawatt load 
drawing power for one hour. 
63  For more details on how this index is constructed see, for example, Annex 1 of “OF. CIRCULAR: Nº 
06557/DIE  2086 /SE 1174 /” from the Superintendence of Electricity and Fuels of Chile. 
64  Two more regions have been created more recently. 
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represent climate, I use the long-term mean winter temperature measured in degrees 
Celsius.65 Alternatively, climate and income variation among regions is represented by 
incorporating fixed effects for 12 of the 13 regions and for 2 of the 3 time periods. 
Because of the proximity of regions and similarity of economic and climatic 
circumstances, I also consider a less-detailed regional representation with just one fixed 
effect for Regions 3 through 9 representing the central zone and one other fixed effect 
representing the metropolitan zone (Region 13 or RM). The metropolitan zone stands 
apart from the rest of the central region because Santiago concentrates close to 40% of 
the population and nearly 50% of the GDP in a single region. 
The dataset used for the estimation is an unbalanced panel consisting of 69 
observations on 22 firms for 1996 and 1997, and 25 firms for 1998. At least one firm 
operates in each of the 13 regions of the country. The data available for each firm during 
this period is total electricity sales, price charged to consumers (variable and fixed rates), 
number of clients served, and an indicator of the quality of service.66 The GDP data are 
available for each region and each time period (Banco Central de Chile, 2007). Long-
term mean winter temperatures reflect the climate of the main populated areas of each 
region. The temperatures can be considered 30-year averages for the months of June, July 
and August for each region, and are thus constant across the time period considered in 
this study (see Departamento Geofísica - Universidad de Chile, 2006).  
                                                 
65 Unfortunately, no systematic aggregation of local temperatures is available that reflects year-to-year 
variation and yet corresponds with firm-level data. Because the use of air conditioning by residential 
consumers is not very common, summer temperature are not included, nor did preliminary analysis 
suggest doing so. 
66  See footnote 63. 
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Figure 5.1. Map of Chile and its Regions 
 
Source: Iriarte, Lobos and Jaksic (2005). 
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Although the quality index does not have much dispersion in values, it seems to 
have a distribution close to normal (see Figure 5.2). According to agents from the 
industry, an explanation for this concentration is that it was politically unadvisable for the 
regulatory agency to have some scores “too far away from the group.” This could have 
had consequences on company value that the regulator was not prepared to face. This is 
understandable given that this was an initial effort to include quality in a regulatory 
scheme that was itself relatively new. 
Figure 5.2. Histogram of the Quality Index 
 
Source: Data from the SEC. 
 
In the period 1996 to 1998, national per-client residential energy consumption 
increased as indicated in Table 5.1. This table also shows per client consumption for 
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may be explained by the economic crisis of 1997, which had different effects among 
regions according to economic activities and weather. 
Table 5.1. Average per Capita Energy Consumption (MW-h per Client per Year) 
Region 1996 1997 1998 
1 1,672 1,850 2,004 
2 1,366 1,613 1,747 
3 1,146 1,221 1,287 
4 1,177 1,205 1,257 
5 1,181 1,361 1,395 
6 1,012 1,053 1,095 
7 1,543 1,255 1,349 
8 1,331 1,189 1,258 
9 1,301 1,603 1,323 
10 2,050 2,170 2,087 
11 1,272 1,310 1,352 
12 1,700 1,601 1,672 
13 1,749 1,812 1,917 
Country Average 1,749 1,812 1,917 
Source: Data from the CNE. 
 
In the period of study, prices have been falling as indicated by Table 5.2. Also, 
prices are lower in the more densely populated area of Chile (regions 5 through 8 and 13) 
than in the remote regions of the country (regions 1 through 3 and 10 through 12). For the 
period 1996 through 1998, national average per capita GDP increased only slightly (not 
shown). 
5.5 Estimation Results 
 Because available data is rather limited, the estimation does not attempt to 
recover the parameters explicitly corresponding to the demand function used in Chapter 4 
for the simulation [see equation (4.2.1)], which would require the use of nonlinear 
estimation methods. Rather, I estimate a linearized model that considers the main 
variables affecting demand.  
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Table 5.2. Average Electricity Price (Chilean 1998 Pesos per kW-h) 
Region 1996 1997 1998 Period average 
1 70.20 65.33 64.88 66.80 
2 69.67 64.08 62.95 65.57 
3 70.56 65.86 61.74 66.06 
4 67.72 63.65 59.36 63.58 
5 60.92 57.71 53.86 57.50 
6 68.82 65.41 60.74 64.99 
7 54.73 59.95 55.77 57.23 
8 60.20 57.60 53.22 56.72 
9 63.18 60.08 57.40 60.22 
10 64.65 62.19 60.33 62.11 
11 86.26 80.48 80.42 82.39 
12 66.59 67.49 69.49 67.86 
13 56.77 53.42 49.22 53.14 
National average 63.80 60.69 57.64 60.58 
Source: Data from the CNE.  
 
5.5.1 Estimation with Fixed Effects 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the estimation of several alternative models along 
with associated diagnostic tests in Table 5.4. All models include the quality index lagged 
one-period, price (in log-linear form), a cross term between quality and price (in log 
form), and the number of clients served (log-linear and log-squared forms). Model M1, 
the most general model, also includes squared forms of price and quality as well as fixed 
effects for regions and years.67 Adding the fixed rate of the two part tariff (both log-linear 
and log-squared terms) was also considered but, as Table 5.5 shows, an F-statistic of 0.63 
for the hypothesis that both coefficients are simultaneously zero supports excluding these 
terms with a p-value of 0.537. These variables are also excluded on economic grounds 
because the fixed part of the tariff does not affect marginal behavior according to 
economic theory. Also, unlike some other areas of the world, the variable component of 
                                                 
67  Random effects models were also estimated but performed very poorly. No coefficient was significant, 
which is probably due to the small number of time periods available. 
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Table 5.3. Regression Resultsa 
 
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values. All models are estimated with 69 observations. 
b Estimated coefficients of regional and time dummy variables included in models M1 and M2 are reported in Table A.1 of the appendix. 
Dependent variable Ln (quantity)     Model: M1b M2b M3 M3R M4 M4R M5 M6 M6R M7 M7R
Quality 2.135 1.668 1.378 1.378 -1.061 -1.061 1.128 -2.659 -2.659 -1.201 -1.201
(1.27) (1.10) (0.91) (1.20) (-1.84) (-1.80) (0.74) (-1.30) (-1.76) (-1.52) (-1.40)
[0.209] [0.277] [0.368] [0.235] [0.070] [0.078] [0.462] [0.198] [0.084] [0.134] [0.168]
Quality squared -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 0.007 0.007            
(-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.83) (-1.41) (0.78) (0.86)            
[0.074] [0.099] [0.095] [0.072] [0.165] [0.441] [0.392]            
Ln(price) -1.711 -3.307 -4.856 -4.856 -24.821 -24.821 -5.039 -31.832 -31.832 -28.085 -28.085
(-0.10) (-0.20) (-0.31) (-0.35) (-1.92) (-1.90) (-0.32) (-1.50) (-1.68) (-1.58) (-1.48)
[0.922] [0.839] [0.754] [0.729] [0.059] [0.062] [0.751] [0.139] [0.099] [0.118] [0.144]
Ln(price) squared -0.666 -0.876 -1.591 -1.591 -1.323 0.096 0.096            
(-0.58) (-0.78) (-1.98) (-2.26) (-1.53) (0.08) (0.12)            
[0.563] [0.439] [0.052] [0.028] [0.132] [0.933] [0.904]            
Quality*Ln(price) 0.076 0.109 0.189 0.189 0.264 0.264 0.166 0.332 0.332 0.300 0.300
(0.47) (0.74) (1.33) (1.49) (1.89) (1.86) (1.17) (1.67) (1.67) (1.56) (1.46)
[0.643] [0.464] [0.187] [0.141] [0.063] [0.067] [0.248] [0.100] [0.101] [0.123] [0.151]
Ln(clients) -0.934 -0.941 -0.676 -0.676 -0.710 -0.710 -0.757 -0.793 -0.793 -0.775 -0.775
(-5.11) (-5.18) (-4.60) (-4.53) (-4.74) (-4.72) (-4.77) (-3.58) (-3.56) (-3.56) (-3.38)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ln(clients) squared 0.043 0.043 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.035 0.035
(5.11) (5.15) (4.46) (4.53) (4.59) (4.72) (4.65) (3.46) (3.65) (3.43) (3.42)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Central Zone -0.480 -0.480 -0.431 -0.431 -0.484
(-8.57) (-11.02) (-8.21) (-11.74) (-7.61)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]
Metropolitan Region -0.192 -0.192 -0.204 -0.204 -0.177
(-2.56) (-2.46) (-2.70) (-2.94) (-2.10)
[0.013] [0.017] [0.009] [0.005] [0.041]
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.050 0.182 0.182 0.204 0.204
(-0.59) (1.87) (2.35) (2.23) (2.72)
[0.557] [0.066] [0.022] [0.030] [0.008]
Mean winter temperature -0.021 -0.073 -0.073 -0.071 -0.071
(-0.64) (-1.76) (-2.53) (-1.77) (-2.38)
[0.522] [0.083] [0.014] [0.081] [0.020]
Mean winter temperature squared 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.99) (1.68) (2.26) (1.63) (2.06)
[0.326] [0.099] [0.028] [0.108] [0.044]
Constant -82.950 -57.641 -42.717 -42.717 111.006 111.006 -29.828 197.819 197.819 122.592 122.592
(-0.80) (-0.61) (-0.45) (-0.61) (2.09) (2.04) (-0.32) (1.57) (2.21) (1.68) (1.55)
[0.431] [0.543] [0.652] [0.542] [0.041] [0.046] [0.753] [0.123] [0.031] [0.098] [0.128]
R2 0.749 0.741 0.671 0.671 0.643 0.643 0.689 0.353 0.353 0.346 0.346
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.640 0.621 0.621 0.602 0.602 0.622 0.242 0.242 0.259 0.259
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Table 5.4. Joint Effects and Diagnostics Testsa 
 
a Numbers in brackets are p-values. 
 
M1 M2 M3 M3R M4 M4R M5 M6 M6R M7 M7R
F-tests for joint effects
All price terms 0.19 0.69 3.71 7.16 3.70 5.80 2.99 1.47 2.88 2.01 3.52
[0.904] [0.563] [0.016] [<0.001] [0.031] [0.005] [0.039] [0.233] [0.044] [0.143] [0.036]
All quality terms 2.07 1.97 3.44 5.98 3.45 5.80 2.66 1.87 2.73 2.58 4.17
[0.118] [0.131] [0.022] [0.001] [0.038] [0.005] [0.057] [0.145] [0.052] [0.084] [0.020]
Number of clients 13.09 13.40 11.48 10.27 12.35 11.15 12.00 7.16 7.11 7.28 5.91
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005]
Mean winter temperature . . . . . . 1.56 1.57 3.30 1.67 3.37
. . . . . . [0.220] [0.217] [0.044] [0.196] [0.041]
Diagnostics
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 1.273 1.183 0.001 . 0.394 . 0.065 0.011 . 0.002 .
[0.259] [0.277] [0.974] . [0.530] . [0.799] [0.916] . [0.969] .
Ramsey RESET 1.04 1.15 1.92 [1.924] 2.84 2.84 1.95 1.52 1.52 1.77 1.77
[0.384] [0.338] [0.136] [0.136] [0.046] [0.046] [0.133] [0.219] [0.219] [0.162] [0.162]
Cameron and Trivedi Decomposition of Information Matrix
Heteroskedasticity 69.00 69.00 57.59 . 48.11 . 69.00 66.06 . 57.74 .
[0.443] [0.443] [0.068] . [0.019] . [0.443] [0.126] . [0.043] .
Skewness 23.14 21.68 14.23 . 12.35 . 13.81 16.20 . 13.74 .
[0.336] [0.300] [0.115] . [0.090] . [0.313] [0.094] . [0.089] .
Kurtosis 1.62 1.58 1.19 . 1.53 . 1.41 1.17 . 0.93 .
[0.203] [0.208] [0.274] . [0.215] . [0.236] [0.279] . [0.336] .
Total 93.77 92.26 73.01 . 62.00 . 84.22 83.43 . 72.40 .
[0.372] [0.357] [0.036] . [0.008] . [0.381] [0.062] . [0.021] .
Tests of Significance
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Table 5.5. F-Tests Regarding Model Specification 
 
   Degrees of 
Model Hypothesis Test F-Statistic Freedom p-value 
 
M1  Eliminate fixed rate terms if added to M1 0.63 2,45 0.537 
M1 Eliminate fixed year effects 0.75 2,47 0.480 
M1 Central zone vs. 12 regional effects 1.80 11,47 0.082 
M1 Central zone vs. 12 regional & 2 year dummies 1.65 13,47 0.106 
M1 Central & Metropolitan zones vs. 12 regional effects 1.37 10,47 0.223 
M1 Central & Metropolitan vs. 12 regional & 2 year effects 1.21 12,47 0.303 
M2 Central zone vs. 12 regional dummies 1.83 11,49 0.074 
M2 Central & Metropolitan zones vs. 12 regional dummies 1.32 10,49 0.246 
M3R Combine Central & Metropolitan zones into one fixed effect 11.35 1,59 0.001 
M3R Eliminate squared price & quality terms 2.96 2,59 0.060 
 
 
Chile’s electricity rates are constant rather than block declining so no additional income 
effects of rate variation require consideration. 
Starting from Model M1 in Table 5.3, the hypothesis that fixed effects for years, 
have no effect is supported according to the F-statistic of 0.75 with a p-value of 0.480 
(see Table 5.5). The replacement of fixed effects for all individual regions with a fixed 
effect for the central zone alone is marginally rejected (at the 0.10 level but not at the 
0.05 level) with a p-value of 0.082 (Table 5.5). When these two changes are considered 
jointly (a central zone fixed effect instead of both individual regional and year fixed 
effects), the change is supported but only marginally with a p-value of 0.106 (Table 5.5). 
However the central and metropolitan zone fixed effects satisfactorily replace either all 
individual regional effects or all regional and year fixed effects. The replacement of fixed 
effects for all individual regions with fixed effects for the central zone and metropolitan 
zones alone is supported by an F-test with a p-value of 0.223. The F-test for jointly 
replacing both individual region and year fixed effects with only the central and 
metropolitan zone fixed effects is supported with a p-value of 0.303. 
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Although these results suggest eliminating fixed effects for both individual 
regions and years in favor of a model with fixed effects for only the central and 
metropolitan zones, Model M2 presents further confirming results based on the 
regressions after eliminating fixed effects for years (Table 5.3). Compared to Model M1, 
these results yield a small increase in the adjusted R2 and F-statistics for regression 
significance (the latter is not shown). The F-tests for fixed effects specifications are 
similar to those for Model M1. Replacement of fixed effects for all individual regions 
with a fixed effect for the central zone alone is marginally rejected (at the 0.10 level but 
not at the 0.05 level) with a p-value of 0.074 (Table 5.5). But the replacement of fixed 
effects for all individual regions with fixed effects for the central and metropolitan zones 
is supported by an F-test with a p-value of 0.246 (Table 5.5). 
The F-tests associated with Models M1 and M2 support the estimation of Model 
M3 as the final form of the model with fixed effects. Although the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity does not reject homoskedasticity, the Cameron and 
Trivedi test based on decomposition of the information matrix rejects homoskedasticity 
with a p-value of 0.068 (see Table 5.4). For this reason, robust test statistics are estimated 
for Model M3 using White’s corrected standard errors as presented in Model M3R. Thus, 
the standard errors associated with Model M3R are considered the appropriate basis for 
evaluating various hypotheses regarding the final fixed-effects model. By comparison, 
conventional spherical-distribution assumptions are not rejected for Models M1 and M2 
by the diagnostic tests in Table 5.4. Thus, standard errors are not re-estimated for these 
models. 
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The adjusted R2 for Model M3R (or Model M3) is slightly lower than for models 
M1 and M2 at 0.62. However, Model M3R yields much better significance in estimating 
the effects of price and quality because regional differences in demand due to differences 
in price and quality are not also “explained” by regional fixed effects. The first four lines 
of Table 5.4 present F-statistics depicting the significance of joint effects of terms 
involving the key variables. The joint hypothesis of removing all price terms from the 
equation has an F-statistic with p-value less than 0.001 compared to 0.904 and 0.563 with 
Models M1 and M2, respectively. The joint hypothesis of removing all quality terms 
from the equation has an F-statistic with p-value 0.001 compared to 0.118 and 0.131 with 
Models M1 and M2, respectively. 
The results also demonstrate a significant joint role for the number of clients 
suggesting an importance of population density as a life-style explanation of demand. 
The results also yield considerable statistical significance of the fixed effects with a p-
value less than 0.001 for the central zone effect and a p-value of 0.017 for the 
metropolitan zone effect. A similar test also soundly rejects the hypothesis of combining 
the central and metropolitan zones into one fixed effect (see Table 5.5). Thus, life-style 
factors appear to have a further significant difference in the extreme urban circumstances 
of Santiago not reflected by the number of clients. 
Model M4 considers removing the squared terms involving price and quality from 
the model. Even though removing these squared terms from Model M3R, is rejected at 
the 10 percent level either individually (see Table 5.3 where p-values are 0.028 and 
0.072, respectively) or jointly (see Table 5.5) where the p-value is 0.060), the estimation 
results without them are presented in Model M4 as a reference point. Because 
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homoskedasticity is rejected at least with the Cameron and Trivedi test based on 
decomposition of the information matrix, the results are also presented with robust 
estimation of standard errors using White’s method in Model M4R. As expected, 
dropping the significant squared terms causes a decline in the adjusted R2 although only 
slightly. Also, the significance of the key quality and price variables increases 
substantially in this model, and the critical cross term between price and quality becomes 
significant at the 0.067 level, confirming the importance of the interaction effect and 
showing that it is positive (as estimated in all models). However, the Ramsey RESET test 
rejects the hypothesis that this model has no omitted variables whereas it does not do so 
in Models M1 through M3R. 
5.5.2 Estimation Based on Income and Temperature 
The final three columns of Table 5.3 report results with three other specifications 
of the model that investigate the effects of income and climate on demand. Income and 
climate vary relatively little within regions over the short three-year span of observed 
data compared to their variation among regions. For example, a regression of GDP per 
capita (in log-linear form) on the twelve regional fixed effects alone shows that 99.1% of 
the variation in income is accounted by regional fixed effects. Further, the available 
climate variables for this study are long-term climate variables that vary only by region. 
Thus, because Models M1 through M4R do not include income and climate, the fixed 
regional effects likely capture most of the effects of these variables. In these 
circumstances with very few time series observations, fixed regional effects can prevent 
identification of the effects of income and climate and even over-explain the variation in 
demand because of random region-specific variation. By comparison, more precise 
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estimation of the effects of income and climate may be possible in absence of regional 
fixed effects because differences in demand due to differences in income and climate are 
not also “explained” by the regional fixed effects. This is the motivation for reporting 
results for these three additional models. 
Model M5 adds regional per capita GDP (log-linear form) and mean winter 
temperature (in both linear and squared forms) to Model M3. The adjusted R2 is almost 
identical to Model M3 (or Model M3R) and none of the three additional variables are 
significant. Consistent with the above explanation, this low significance of income and 
climate is due to the presence of fixed regional effects in the model. Further, the 
estimated income elasticity (the coefficient of the GDP variable) is negative (-0.050) and 
thus implausible, although insignificant. 
Models M6R and M7R revise Models M3R and M4R, respectively, by replacing 
the two fixed effects (central and metropolitan zones) with the three income and climate 
variables added in Model M5. This change causes a dramatic decline in the adjusted R2 
from 0.602-0.622 in Models M3R, M4R, and M5 to 0.242-0.259 in Models M6R and 
M7R. Although the diagnostic statistics in Table 5.4 do not reject conventional 
calculation of standard errors for Model M5, several of the results from the Cameron and 
Trivedi test based on decomposition of the information matrix associated with Models 
M6 and M7 (shown in Table 5.4) suggest calculation of White’s robust standard errors. 
These are the standard errors reported for Model M6R and M7R in Table 5.3.  
The results for Model M6R show that the significance of each of the three income 
and climate variables is very high when the fixed effects are dropped, confirming that 
income and climate effects are included in fixed effects when fixed effects are estimated. 
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The p-values for the coefficients of all three income and climate variables are in the range 
of 0.014-0.028. The F-test for joint exclusion of temperature variables in Table 5.4 also 
yields a high level of significance with a p-value of 0.044. Moreover, the joint 
significance of all price terms and of all quality terms remains high, although not quite as 
high as in Model M3R (see Table 5.4). Further, the climate variables have plausible 
effects whereby lower winter temperatures cause greater demand, although with 
tempered effects in the extreme regions of either the far north or far south. The income 
elasticity is also positive as expected and of a plausible magnitude, 0.182.  
The 90 percent confidence interval on the income elasticity is (0.053, 0.312). This 
estimate is in line with many other studies. For the United States, Halvorsen (1975) 
estimates an income elasticity of 0.28 or 0.66 depending on the estimation method, 
Chang and Hsing (1991) find values between 0.13 and 0.36 using firm level aggregation, 
and Kaserman and Mayo (1985) find values between 0.062 and 0.156 depending on the 
model. In Latin America, (see Westley, 1984; 1989), using GDP per household, finds an 
elasticity of 0.42 for Paraguay and 0.25 for Costa Rica. In Chile, Benavente, et al. (2005) 
find income elasticities of 0.2 in the long-term and 0.079 in the short-term working with 
monthly data, and Chumacero, Paredes and Sánchez (2000) find a short-term elasticity 
between 0.27 and 0.51.  
The results for Model M7R compare to Model M4R where the two fixed effects 
(central and metropolitan zones) are replaced with the three income and climate 
variables. While the significance of the individual price and quality variables in this 
regression are somewhat less than for Model M4R, the joint significance of all price 
variables (p-value of 0.036) and all quality variables (p-value of 0.020) is quite high as is 
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the significance of income and temperature variables both individually (see Table 5.3) 
and jointly (see Table 5.4). The most interesting result in this regression is that the 
Ramsey RESET test does not imply significance of missing variables even when squared 
price and quality terms are omitted as does Model M4R. 
All the models in Table 5.3 include an interaction term between price and quality 
to capture the cross effects discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. This effect captures the cross 
derivative of quantity with respect to quality and price, which if positive implies that 
quality chosen by the monopolist is increasing in the price set by the regulator following 
equation (3.4.4). In all models, the regression results indicate that this term is positive. 
While only marginally significant in the final model with fixed effects (with a p-value of 
0.14 in Model M3R), it is significant in Model M4R (with a p-value of 0.067), and 
essentially significant in Model M6R (with a p-value of 0.101). Thus, the empirical 
results resolve the theoretical ambiguity remaining from Chapters 3 and 4. 
Also, the qualitative implications of other estimated parameters are in general 
agreement with assumptions (3.2.1)-(3.2.4) of Chapter 3 and the associated qualitative 
assumptions of Chapter 4. As the results presented in Section 5.5.4 below confirm, the 
estimated price elasticities are negative and the estimated quality elasticities are positive 
except for a small set of extreme data points. Also, although exceptions occur for some 
extreme values of p and s in some models, the estimated parameters imply that Qpp > 0 
for all models in Table 5.3, corresponding to cases in Chapter 3 where second-order 
conditions clearly hold. Similarly, the results also confirm that Qss < 0 as assumed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 for all sample values in Models 1, 2, 3 and 5. 
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5.5.3 Estimation with First-Differences 
Another way to control for fixed effects is to estimate a model with variables in 
first-differenced form. The results from four different models are presented in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6. Regression Results from First-Differenced Modelsa 
 
a All variables are used in first-differenced form by time.  
Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values. 
 
When variables are used in first-differenced form, the number of usable 
observations is reduced by the number of observations in a given time period. Also, only 
22 of the 25 observations for 1998 can be used because only 22 observations exist for the 
comparison year in 1997, which is the same as exists for comparing 1997 to 1996. Thus, 
only 44 first-differenced observations are available for estimation of Models MD1 and 
Variable MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4
Ln(quantity) lagged                       0.061 0.157
                      (0.38) (1.15)
                      [0.712] [0.269]
Quality 0.014 -0.192 0.105 -0.481
(0.03) (-0.97) (0.19) (-2.59)
[0.978] [0.338] [0.848] [0.020]
Quality squared -0.001            -0.003             
(-0.47)            (-1.17)             
[0.641]            [0.260]             
Ln(price) -5.028 -5.504 -9.629 -11.551
(-0.78) (-1.23) (-1.55) (-2.75)
[0.441] [0.225] [0.144] [0.014]
Ln(price) squared 0.004            -0.006             
(0.01)            (-0.01)             
[0.994]            [0.993]             
Quality*Log(price) 0.043 0.049 0.100 0.120
(0.85) (1.01) (2.00) (2.63)
[0.400] [0.319] [0.065] [0.018]
Ln(clients) 1.352 1.363 -2.035 -1.751
(3.38) (3.55) (-2.19) (-2.12)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.046] [0.050]
Ln(clients) squared -0.084 -0.085 0.096 0.076
(-3.32) (-3.50) (1.71) (1.54)
[0.002] [0.001] [0.109] [0.142]
R2 0.511 0.508 0.779 0.757
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.444 0.653 0.666
Observations 44 44 22 22
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MD2. Models MD1 and MD2 correspond in specification to Models M3 and M4 in Table 
5.3 because fixed effects disappear with first differencing. Models MD3 and MD4 have 
forms corresponding to Models MD1 and MD2, respectively, aside from adding a lagged 
dependent variable as a right-hand side variable. The presence of a lagged dependent 
variable reduces the number of observations further to 22 so that these models represent 
only a cross section rather than a panel.  
Table 5.7. Joint Effects of Terms in the First-Differenced Modelsa 
  
a This table reports F-statistics with p-values in brackets. 
 
The results for Models MD1 and MD2 have low precision for all individual price 
and quality variables (Table 5.6) and for all quality terms jointly (Table 5.7). Although 
the joint significance of all price terms is quite high (Table 5.7), the implication is that 
dropping a full year’s worth of observations in order to enable estimation by first 
differencing gives up too much ability to identify the critical quality parameters of 
interest for this study. 
Interestingly, when the lagged quantity variable is added to the estimation 
problem, the significance of coefficient estimates for individual quality variables 
improves substantially (Models MD3 and MD4). However, the coefficient of the lagged 
quantity variable is not significant at customary levels (p-values of 0.712 and 0.269 with 
Models MD3 and MD4, respectively), which thus does not provide clear support this 
generalization of the model. Nevertheless, all price terms are jointly significant with 
Hypothesis Test MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4
F-tests for joint effects
All price terms 10.34 16.83 2.63 7.34
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.091] [0.005]
All quality terms 0.89 1.28 3.34 4.51
[0.457] [0.289] [0.050] [0.028]
Number of clients 5.74 6.32 9.12 12.08
[0.007] [0.004] [0.003] [<0.001]
 126
Models MD3 and MD4 with respective p-values of 0.091 and 0.005 as are all quality 
terms with respective p-values of 0.050 and 0.028. 
Based on these results, the estimates in Table 5.3 appear to be preferable in terms 
of precision and significance to the results based on first differences. Apparently, a major 
part of the explanation lies in the substantial reduction in the number of observations 
available for estimation when first-differenced data are used (a result not atypical when 
time series are extremely short). Although the first-differenced results appear somewhat 
more significant upon addition of a lagged dependent variable, the addition of a lagged 
dependent variable in the non-differenced estimation approach of Table 5.3 did not 
produce satisfactory results (aside from the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, 
no coefficient was individually significant nor was the group of terms involving any 
individual variable jointly significant).  
5.5.4 Estimated Elasticities of Price and Quality  
To assess the crucial information provided by the estimation of this chapter about 
price and quality elasticities, both are estimated at a variety of percentiles of the price and 
quality data. Based on the model in equation (5.3.1), the price elasticities are estimated by 
2 3 52 ln p sη β β β= + +  and 2 5sη β β= +  for models with and without the squared price 
term, respectively. And quality elasticity is estimated by 2 4 5( 2 ln )s p sυ β β β= + +  and 
2 5( ln )p sυ β β= +  for models with and without squared quality, respectively. The price 
and quality elasticities for models without the squared terms are evaluated at the 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the sample values for p and s, respectively.68 For 
                                                 
68 The calculations were made using the lincom command in Stata 9.2, which uses the variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimated coefficients to compute the variance of the expression that is evaluated. 
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models that have squared terms, both price and quality elasticities at a given percentile 
are evaluated where both price and quality are at that percentile of their respective sample 
distributions. In the first-differenced models, the elasticities are estimated similarly, 
except for models with lagged quantity as the independent variable. In model MD3, the 
short-run elasticities are estimated similarly but the long-run price and quality elasticities 
are estimated following 
  2 3 5( 2 ln ) /(1 )p sη β β β α= + + −  and  
 2 4 5( 2 ln ) /(1 )s p sυ β β β α= + + − ,  
respectively, and in model MD4 they are estimated by 2 5( ) /(1 )sη β β α= + −  and 
2 5( ln ) /(1 )p sυ β β α= + − , respectively, where α  is the coefficient of lagged quantity.
69 
Estimated price elasticities corresponding to selected models in Table 5.3 are 
given in Table 5.8. In the preferred fixed-effects model, Model M3R, the price elasticities 
are negative and significant at all corresponding percentiles of the price and quality 
distributions except the 10th and 25th, where they are negative but not significant. The 
values of the significant elasticities range from -0.42 to -0.60. In Model M2, all estimated 
elasticities are negative but none are significant, a result that is probably explained by the 
fact that extensive representation of fixed effects permits the fixed effects to “explain” 
much of the variation due to price and quality. In Model M4R, price elasticities are all 
negative except at the 90th percentile, which along with the 75th percentile is not 
significant. The values of the significant elasticities of this model range from -0.37 to 
0.78− . The interesting contrast between price elasticities between Models M3R and M4R 
is that price elasticities are increasing in price in Model M3R but decreasing in price with 
                                                 
69 The estimation of these elasticities was done using the command nlcom in Stata 9.2, which uses the delta 
method. 
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Model M4R. However, the results of Models M6R and M7R, where fixed effects are 
replaced by income and climate variables, are roughly in harmony with the results of 
Model M4R including the effects of increasing price as well as in magnitude and 
significance. As a reference point, the case of Model M3R where price elasticities are 
increasing in price is the case where demand has less curvature than a constant elasticity 
function, whereas the other cases are more sharply convex to the origin.  
Table 5.8. Price Elasticity of Demand at Different Percentilesa 
  
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values. 
 
Estimated price elasticities resulting from the differenced models in Table 5.6 are 
presented in Table 5.9. These models yield significance for a wider range of percentiles, 
with price elasticities ranging from -0.257 to -0.760 in the long run and from -0.241 to 
-0.61 in the short run. In these models, elasticities are always smaller in magnitude at 
higher percentiles, which also implies sharper curvature than a constant elasticity 
function. In general, long-run elasticities are higher than short-run elasticities. 
These results are also roughly consistent with other results found in the literature. 
For example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Muskens, and Leeuwen (2002) present a survey where 
Percentile M2 M3R M4R M6R M7R
10th percentile -0.163 -0.029 -0.784 -0.864 -0.772
(-0.320) (-0.060) (-3.400) (-2.210) (-2.600)
[0.751] [0.950] [0.001] [0.031] [0.012]
25th percentile -0.252 -0.200 -0.520 -0.510 -0.471
(-0.800) (-0.710) (-2.780) (-2.160) (-2.220)
[0.430] [0.481] [0.007] [0.035] [0.030]
50th percentile -0.370 -0.420 -0.369 -0.300 -0.300
(-1.190) (-2.140) (-1.790) (-1.190) (-1.240)
[0.239] [0.037] [0.079] [0.237] [0.220]
75th percentile -0.431 -0.537 -0.168 -0.031 -0.071
(-1.000) (-2.200) (-0.620) (-0.080) (-0.210)
[0.322] [0.032] [0.537] [0.936] [0.838]
90th percentile -0.464 -0.603 0.008 0.202 0.129
(-0.830) (-1.770) (0.020) (0.380) (0.280)
[0.413] [0.081] [0.982] [0.703] [0.782]
 129
short-run elasticities range from -0.02 to -1.10 and long-run elasticities that range from -
0.26 to -1.10. Also Benavente, et al. (2005) present a summary of price elasticity 
estimation from various other studies that find price elasticities between -0.13 and -0.90 
for the short run and between -0.17 and -1.89 for the long run. These authors also present 
their own estimates of price elasticities for Chile, which are -0.27 and -0.39 for the short 
and long run, respectively. This last value seems to be relatively low compared to other 
studies in Chile. For example, Chumacero, Paredes and Sánchez (2000) find values up to 
–0.79. 
Table 5.9. Price Elasticities from First-Differenced Modelsa 
   
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values, 
 
Estimated quality elasticities corresponding to selected models in Table 5.3 are 
given in Table 5.10. As Table 5.4 shows, quality has a significant effect on demand 
according to almost all the estimated models, and is marginally significant in the only 
exceptions (Models M1 and M2). Using estimates from model M3R, the quality elasticity 
of demand ranges from 1.268 to 1.859 across different corresponding percentiles of the 
price and quality distributions (see Table 5.10). This impact is high, especially if 
Percentile MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4 MD3 MD4
10th percentile -1.050 -1.063 -0.538 -0.641 -0.573 -0.760
(-3.990) (-5.740) (-2.030) (-3.280) (-1.830) (-3.030)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.062] [0.005] [0.088] [0.008]
25th percentile -1.006 -1.014 -0.439 -0.521 -0.468 -0.618
(-5.260) (-5.760) (-2.120) (-2.730) (-1.940) (-2.630)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.053] [0.015] [0.072] [0.018]
50th percentile -0.980 -0.986 -0.383 -0.452 -0.408 -0.537
(-5.260) (-5.590) (-1.670) (-2.340) (-1.610) (-2.310)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.118] [0.032] [0.130] [0.035]
75th percentile -0.946 -0.949 -0.307 -0.361 -0.327 -0.428
(-4.140) (-5.160) (-1.060) (-1.790) (-1.060) (-1.800)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [0.306] [0.092] [0.307] [0.090]
90th percentile -0.917 -0.916 -0.241 -0.281 -0.257 -0.334
(-3.290) (-4.680) (-0.700) (-1.320) (-0.700) (-1.340)
[0.002] [<0.001] [0.098] [0.206] [0.495] [0.200]
Short Run Long Run
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compared to the estimated price elasticities of demand. However, none of the estimated 
elasticities at various percentiles are significant according to Model M3R. Alternatively, 
Models M4R, M6R, and M7R estimate significant elasticities at the upper price and 
quality levels that range between 4.22 and 9.56 (see Table 5.10). Further, the precision of 
quality elasticity estimates (as measured by standard errors not shown) is roughly similar 
across the various price levels. Thus, the results suggest that the quality elasticity varies 
widely among the population with much greater sensitivity at higher price levels. 
Table 5.10. Quality Elasticity of Demand at Different Percentilesa 
  
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values. 
 
The estimated quality elasticities implied by the first-differenced models in Table 
5.6 are presented in Table 5.11. As Table 5.7 shows, quality does not have a significant 
effect on quantity according to Models MD1 and MD2, but is significant according to the 
first-differenced models with lagged dependent variables, Models MD3 and MD4. From 
the first-differenced models, only Model MD4 yields significant elasticities. These 
quality elasticities are significant when evaluated at the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of 
both the price and quality distributions. These quality elasticities range from 0.998 to 
Percentile M2 M3R M4R M6R M7R
10th percentile 2.406 1.405 -3.046 -5.506 -3.090
(0.610) (0.440) (-0.800) (-1.130) (-0.55)
[0.546] [0.663] [0.428] [0.263] [0.586]
25th percentile 1.482 1.268 -0.330 -0.788 <0.001
(0.700) (0.580) (-0.130) (-0.230) (<0.001)
[0.487] [0.566] [0.896] [0.817] [0.999]
50th percentile 1.334 1.859 2.188 3.134 2.864
(0.930) (1.110) (1.420) (1.240) (1.25)
[0.357] [0.272] [0.161] [0.221] [0.218]
75th percentile 0.567 1.682 4.228 6.723 5.185
(0.240) (0.800) (3.150) (2.210) (2.68)
[0.810] [0.430] [0.003] [0.031] [0.010]
90th percentile -0.230 1.325 5.761 9.560 6.929
(-0.070) (0.470) (3.390) (2.400) (2.87)
[0.948] [0.642] [0.001] [0.020] [0.006]
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2.620 in the short run and from 1.185 to 3.109 in the long run (see Table 5.11). As for 
Models M4R, and M7R, quality elasticities of demand are estimated to increase as both 
the price and quality levels increase for Model M6R. 
The estimated quality elasticities of demand for electricity in this study apparently 
have no appropriate comparisons in the literature with which to judge their plausibility. 
However, intuitive reasoning suggests that the quality elasticity is likely to be higher at 
when the price is higher consistent with these results.  
Table 5.11. Quality Elasticities from First-Differenced Modelsa 
   
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values. 
 
5.6 Conclusions to Chapter 5 
To understand the affect of various regulatory schemes on the behavior of a 
monopolist, information on the quality of the good or service and its effect on demand are 
crucial. This issue has been investigated extensively in the theoretical literature but, in 
most cases, results depend on the marginal effect of quality on relevant agent functions. 
On the other hand, there have been few attempts in the empirical literature of electricity 
Percentile MD1 MD2 MD3 MD4 MD3 MD4
Valued at 10th percentile 0.076 -0.208 -0.406 -1.378 -0.433 -1.635
(0.060) (-0.200) (-0.310) (-1.500) (-0.310) (-1.440)
[0.952] [0.846] [0.758] [0.152] [0.762] [0.170]
Valued at 25th percentile 0.345 0.298 0.129 -0.144 0.138 -0.171
(0.480) (0.420) (0.667) (-0.250) (0.190) (-0.250)
[0.637] [0.673] [0.849] [0.804] [0.848] [0.805]
Valued at 50th percentile 0.655 0.765 0.797 0.998 0.849 1.185
(1.020) (1.330) (1.460) (2.020) (1.340) (1.880)
[0.313] [0.192] [0.167] [0.060] [0.202] [0.079]
Valued at 75th percentile 0.851 1.145 1.182 1.924 1.259 2.283
(0.870) (1.600) (1.270) (2.870) (1.140) (2.480)
[0.388] [0.118] [0.226] [0.011] [0.273] [0.024]
Valued at 90th percentile 0.978 1.431 1.417 2.620 1.510 3.109
(0.720) (1.570) (1.040) (2.990) (0.950) (2.560)
[0.474] [0.125] [0.314] [0.009] [0.356] [0.021]
Short Run Long Run
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demand to incorporate quality of service, defined comprehensively, in the estimation of 
these functions. This chapter uses data from the electricity sector in Chile to estimate a 
demand function that includes quality. The available data allow estimation only at the 
aggregated firm level for a 3-year period. The novelty in this estimation is the inclusion 
of a variable that reflects the quality of service as perceived by consumers and, 
specifically, of an interaction term between price and quality that is crucial in signing 
qualitative theoretical effects. 
The results of estimation suggest a price inelastic short-run demand, which is 
consistent with other studies, although slightly higher than the most recent study done in 
Chile. The statistical significance of the interaction term indicates that the price elasticity 
of demand increases with quality. As indicated in Chapter 2, Spence (1975) incorporated 
quality in regulation and found that, if the price elasticity of demand declines (increases) 
with quality, then the monopolist tends to under(over) supply quality.70 Thus, given the 
empirical results found in this chapter, an unregulated monopolist will tend to oversupply 
quality in this market.  
The joint implication of the results in this chapter and Chapter 4 is that the impact 
of information asymmetry on welfare is proportionally higher and the impact of the scope 
of regulation is proportionally lower than if the cross derivative of demand with respect 
to price and quality were negative. While the results of estimation in this chapter vary 
somewhat among models, most models show that quality has a statistically significant 
and relatively high impact on demand. The implication is that regulatory policy should 
take this into account. Specifically, when setting only price, the impact on quality should 
be considered because of the significant indirect welfare implications.  
                                                 
70  Spence derived this result assuming an elasticity that does not depend on price. 
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The impact of quality on demand also has interesting implications that differ 
among corresponding price and quality segments of the population. Some consumer 
segments have higher demand for quality than others. Thus, regulator pricing policy 
could lead to inefficient results if these differences are not considered. At a minimum, 
this could lead to differences in regulations by zone, region, or price level. 
One of the limitations of the results in this chapter is the fact that quality effects 
may be better reflected in long-run elasticities than short-run elasticities. Thus, future 
studies should attempt estimation with longer time series of data. Data limitations also 
prevented distinguishing firm effects and quality effects. Because the time span of 
available data was short, the variation in data were insufficient to distinguish (if any) the 
effects of regulation on different firms and their qualities. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the dissertation, stating the main 
issues addressed in each chapter. The latter section is intended for the reader who wants 
an overview of the work done and is mainly concerned with conclusions. Therefore, 
Section 6.1 can be skipped with out loss of content. Section 6.2 presents the general 
conclusions that can be derived from this dissertation and suggests futures lines of 
research on this topic. 
6.1 Brief Dissertation Summary  
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the role that service quality, asymmetric 
information, scope of regulation, and regulator’s preferences play in the regulation of 
monopolies, with an application to the case of the Chilean electricity distribution 
industry. When this work was begun, Chile was in the midst of one of its worst crises on 
electricity provision in many years. An important discussion was initiated to determine 
who was to blame. Although not the focus of this dissertation, these events clearly 
suggested that quality of service cannot be neglected in a regulated market.  
In Chapter 1, I present the problem of regulating a monopolist and introduce the 
special conditions of the electricity sector. In many cases, and in Chile in particular, the 
regulatory environment has been inherited from the privatization of state-owned or state-
controlled utilities. In some cases, competition can be fostered in a privatized market, but 
in others, and for electricity distribution in particular, this cannot be done due, at least in 
part, to the economies of scale. In these cases, the best approach has been to privatize and 
regulate, while providing an incentive to increase efficiency. 
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This approach poses its own set of problems. Appropriate price setting requires 
costly information, which may be known by the monopolist but not the regulator. Also, if 
the incentive to reduce costs is too high, the result can be a reduction in long-term 
investments or other activities that may not be considered in the regulation. Quality of 
service is an example. If not included in the regulatory contract, changes in quality may 
serve as a “pressure valve” that the monopolist can use to increase its profit while 
transferring the cost to consumers. Another problem that may emerge is that the regulator 
may be “captured” by the industry or other political constituency, leading to a regulation 
biased towards one of the interested parties. 
The electricity utilities in Chile had been state-owned companies until the early 
1980s. Then a process of horizontal and vertical disintegration began with a requirement 
of financial independence. This was in preparation for the privatization process that 
began in the mid to late 1980s. The vertical disintegration led to a system where several 
companies generate electricity and sell it to distribution companies and other large 
customers. Different companies are in charge of transmission of electricity and get paid 
by the generators for the services they provide. For each independent electricity system, a 
centralized operator defines which generator is to increase or reduce production in order 
to instantaneously meet demand changes. Generators are called into production according 
to their marginal cost as a way of operating at minimum cost. The regulator sets the 
prices of energy and power as well as the distribution toll to small consumers. At the 
same time, large consumer can negotiate freely with distribution or generation 
companies. Although the divestiture effort apparently attempted to place ownership in 
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different hands in the late 1990s, property was quite concentrated. Some groups held 
significant ownership in generation, transmission and distribution. 
The literature on regulation is reviewed in Chapter 2. A special emphasis is given 
to the problems of quality and information, and the lack of its proper joint treatment. The 
first approaches to regulation proposed pricing schemes that would be efficient and 
feasible, such as marginal cost pricing, peak load pricing, and Ramsey-Boiteux pricing. 
On the other hand, most common schemes implemented were very different than the ones 
proposed by theory. Rather, they tended to impose a cost-of-service regulation where 
firms are allowed to charge a price that gives them a “fair” rate of return. 
The newer theory is based on the mechanism design literature and considers 
adverse selection and moral hazard, focusing principally in the revelation of unknown 
true costs. Chapter 2 uses this approach to analyze quality in the context of a monopolist. 
Results in the literature show that setting a minimum quality can cause the exclusion of 
lower end consumers, and that verifiability of quality can generate higher rents to the 
monopolist. Results also show that a high concern for quality can lead to low-powered 
incentive schemes only if quality and quantity are net substitutes. 
Chapter 2 also presents a review of the literature on the Chilean electricity system. 
This literature basically describes its history and privatization, describes and comments 
on the regulatory system, and analyzes some of the problems it has presented (such as 
outages, regulatory capture and other problems of quality of service). None of the 
existing studies for the Chilean electricity system have proposed a model that addresses 
these issues. This motivates Chapter 3 where I develop a model to address them 
analytically. 
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In Chapter 3, I develop four theoretical models of regulation that explicitly 
consider the regulation of price and quality versus regulation only of price, and 
symmetric versus asymmetric information depending on whether the regulator knows the 
monopolist’s true costs. In these models, I also consider the effect of a regulator that may 
have a preference favoring consumers or the regulated firm. I conclude that with 
symmetric information and independent of the scope of regulation, having a regulator 
that prefers consumers or producer does not affect the efficiency of the outcome. I also 
show that the regulator’s inability to set quality, thus obviating price-only regulation, 
leads to an inefficient outcome compared to the first best solution that can be achieved by 
regulating both price and quality. Regulation of both price and quality can also achieve 
efficiency with asymmetric information as long as the regulator does not have a 
preference biased toward consumers or the monopolist. When the regulator has a bias, 
then the equilibrium will be inefficient with asymmetric information. The effect on 
equilibrium price and quality depends on the direction of the effect of quality on the 
marginal effect of price in demand. Also, no closed-form solution can be derived unless 
drastic simplifications are made in the theory.  
To further investigate properties of Chapter 3 theoretical models, Chapter 4 
presents a numerical simulation by assuming flexible functional forms and assuming 
alternative sets of parameters that represent the scenarios of interest. In particular, 
implications of the four main models (price and quality regulation with symmetric 
information, price-only regulation with symmetric information, price and quality 
regulation with asymmetric information, and price-only regulation with asymmetric 
information) are investigated in a combination of possibilities where the marginal effect 
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of quality on the price elasticity of demand is positive or negative and the regulator 
favors consumers, the monopolist or both equally. The results show that when the 
regulator is biased toward consumers (the monopolist), symmetric information models 
yield higher (lower) quality except for the most efficient firm.  
Chapter 5 uses data from the electricity sector in Chile for the years 1996 to 1998, 
including a survey to evaluate quality of service to clients, to estimate price and quality 
elasticities of demand, and to determine if the effect of quality on price elasticity of 
demand is positive. 
6.2 Conclusions 
Instead of presenting the conclusion derived from each chapter separately, which 
are presented at the end of each chapter, this section discusses the main issues addressed 
throughout this dissertation, summarizing the overall implications. These issues examine 
the role that scope of regulation, asymmetric information, and regulator’s preferences 
have on the regulation of monopolies and the consequent impact on welfare, price and 
service quality. A primary purpose is to understand how these apply to the case of the 
Chilean electricity distribution industry 
6.2.1 Scope of Regulation 
By scope of regulation, I mean the number of policy instruments set by the 
regulator, in this case, only price or price and quality. A somewhat unexpected result, 
derived from the analytical models, is the important effect that scope of regulation has on 
inefficiency. If for some exogenous reason the regulator cannot monitor quality and thus 
can set only price, then important welfare losses are incurred. In fact, this is the only 
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condition, of the ones analyzed here, that always causes a departure from the first best. If 
the regulator sets both price and quality, then the first best is achieved by setting price 
equal to marginal cost and setting quality so that the marginal benefit of quality is equal 
to its marginal cost. This result is not achieved when the regulator sets only price and the 
monopolist chooses quality. Price and quality are lower with price-only regulation, 
assuming the most likely form of the cost function. 
The simulation exercise corroborates these results, finding that the use of two 
instruments instead of one yields higher welfare levels independent of the informational 
structure or the regulator’s preference. That is, when regulating both price and quality, 
higher levels of welfare are achieved than when only price is regulated. The highest 
overall welfare levels are achieved when regulating both price and quality under 
symmetric information. This amounts to a first best, where the total surplus is maximized, 
but allocated toward consumers or producers according to the regulator’s preference. In 
this case, the price is set equal to marginal cost by the regulator. As regulation becomes 
incomplete, the solution moves away from this social optimum into equilibriums that are 
closer to the monopolistic solution. In the cases analyzed here, the scope of regulation has 
a larger impact in this reduction than the effect of the information asymmetry, which has 
no effect when the regulator is unbiased. 
More importantly, regulation of both price and quality is weakly preferred by the 
regulator and by regulated firms, independent of the information structure. Therefore, if a 
quality index observable to the regulator can be developed, one should expect to see it 
implemented because both parties prefer it. These results hold for all consumer 
preferences and distributions of firm type examined here. Thus, if complete regulation is 
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defined as the use of all available instruments, then incomplete regulation should be 
observed only when at least one of the available instruments of regulation is not 
verifiable. 
The highest provision of quality is obtained when both quantity and quality are 
regulated jointly regardless of the information structure. As expected, lower quality is 
provided by less efficient firms. This is true for both curvatures of the WTP function that 
were examined. Moreover, under plausible conditions, price and quality are lower if only 
price is regulated. Also, transfers are higher when regulating price and quality, which 
reflects the greater ability of the regulator to transfer surplus from the producer to 
consumers. 
The results thus hinge critically on whether quality is regulated. An important 
assumption in cases that consider quality’s regulation is that quality is verifiable and 
therefore subject to regulation. In reality, however, monitoring of quality may not be easy 
to implement due to legal limitations, political opposition, or costs of monitoring and 
enforcement (which are assumed to be zero here). 
In reality, however, regulation of quality may be difficult. Certainly, quality could 
not be regulated directly in terms of a quality index like the one considered in Chapter 5 
because some of the components are based on unpredictable events such as outages. 
Rather, some components that go into the index may be used as regulatory instruments in 
the form of measurements of real phenomena such as voltage variations, downtime, etc., 
rather than survey responses that would be subject to strategic bias. Further, since these 
measurements could only be enforced ex post, they would likely have to be enforced by 
means of a system of penalties that considers the stochastic nature of most quality issues. 
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Future research should consider how results could change if regulation is in the form of 
penalties rather than standards. Such research should investigate optimal penalties and 
how the use of penalties rather than standards would alter regulated firm behavior. 
6.2.2 Regulator Preferences  
With symmetric information, the relative preference of the regulator for 
consumers versus the monopolist does not have an impact on the efficiency of the 
outcome, only on the distribution of surplus between consumers and the monopolist. 
However, a regulator biased toward consumers cannot extract the producer’s entire 
surplus under asymmetric information. Thus, consumers pay information rents. 
The effects of information asymmetries depend on the regulator’s preferences. 
When the regulator has no bias, quality remains equal between symmetric and 
asymmetric models. But when the regulator’s preference is biased toward consumers 
(producers), symmetric information models yield higher (lower) quality except for the 
most efficient firm, which is unchanged.  
With a regulator that is unbiased or biased toward consumers, prices are a non-
decreasing function of firm type, quantities are a non-increasing function of firm type, 
and, in the presence of asymmetric information, prices (quantities) are higher (lower) 
than under symmetric information due to an extra incentive necessary to reveal the firm’s 
type. These results, obtained in the simulation exercise, are consistent with other studies 
that have examined similar problems. For a regulator biased toward producers, prices are 
lower than marginal costs when regulating with both instruments under asymmetric 
information, except for the most efficient firm. This result can hold because of the non-
linear pricing made possible through transfer payments. 
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6.2.3 Asymmetric Information 
A somewhat surprising result derived from the analytical models is that the 
information gap does not have an impact on efficiency as long as the regulator uses both 
instruments of regulation (price and quality) and does not favor consumers over the 
monopolist. This result holds for both curvatures of the WTP function that were 
examined. 
When the regulator favors consumers, then several results are plausible, including 
the possibility that prices will be higher and quality lower under asymmetric information. 
Most of the other possible outcomes result in lower surplus for consumers.  
This result also applies to the case of price-only regulation where a distortion 
away from the symmetric information outcome occurs when the regulator favors 
consumers. If the regulator favors consumers, then a further wedge, in addition to the one 
due to using only one instrument, is placed between price and marginal cost, thus 
reducing further the efficiency of the outcome. The most likely situation is that price will 
be higher than with price-only regulation under symmetric information. 
The simulation reveals that, in absence of regulator bias, transfers under 
asymmetric information are higher for all firm types. When the regulator is biased toward 
consumers, efficient (inefficient) firms receive a higher (lower) transfer than under 
symmetric information. With a regulator biased toward producers, the transfer is also 
higher when regulating both price and quality vis-à-vis regulating only price, and, when 
regulating both price and quality, is also higher with asymmetric information vis-à-vis 
symmetric information. But when regulating only price, the symmetric information 
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model yields higher transfers, except for the most inefficient firm, in which case they are 
equal. 
From the econometric estimation in Chapter 5, I find that the Qps is positive. 
Together with simulation exercise of Chapter 4, this implies that the impact of 
information asymmetry on welfare is proportionally higher and the impact of the scope of 
regulation is proportionally lower compared to the case where the sign of Qps is negative. 
6.2.4 Electricity Demand in Chile 
Regulatory policy should take into account the fact that quality has a clear impact 
on demand and, thus, on welfare. Specifically, even if the regulator sets only price, the 
impact on quality should be considered. Otherwise, significant welfare losses may result. 
The results from the econometric estimation also suggest a relatively high price 
elasticity when compared to other studies. The results also show that the elasticity of 
quality is large. This estimation also suggests that the price elasticity of demand increases 
with quality, which according to Spence (1975) means that an unregulated monopolist is 
likely to over supply quality.  
Future studies of this type will likely benefit from an expanded dataset that 
includes longer time series and better variables to represent the variation in characteristics 
among regions, firms, or individuals.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Estimated Fixed Effects Associated with Table 5.3 
 
a Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios and numbers in brackets are p-values.  









Region 2 -0.085 -0.082
(-0.68) (-0.67)
[0.499] [0.507]
Region 3 -0.430 -0.424
(-3.73) (-3.73)
[0.001] [0.001]
Region 4 -0.508 -0.508
(-4.33) (-4.37)
[<0.001] [<0.001]
Region 5 -0.628 -0.651
(-4.99) (-5.40)
[<0.001] [<0.001]
Region 6 -0.635 -0.631
(-5.47) (-5.49)
[<0.001] [<0.001]
Region 7 -0.343 -0.373
(-2.73) (-3.16)
[0.009] [0.003]
Region 8 -0.580 -0.608
 (-5.18) (-5.78)
[<0.001] [<0.001]
Region 9 -0.670 -0.701
(-4.18) (-4.59)
[<0.001] [<0.001]
Region 10 -0.089 -0.112
(-0.81) (-1.07)
[0.425] [0.292]
Region 11 -0.287 -0.227
(-1.55) (-1.33)
[0.128] [0.188]
Region 12 -0.072 -0.073
(-0.64) (-0.65)
[0.526] [0.519]
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